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ABSTRACT 
Firefighters and police officers are increasingly called upon to work in each 
other’s spaces but are neither trained nor equipped to do so; consequently, they are 
limited in their ability to enter one another’s high threat areas. Fire complicates the 
police’s ability to respond to hostile incidents by creating visibility issues and 
thermal injuries as the burning building deteriorates. Firefighters are equally 
ill-prepared to enter an environment in which fire and firearms are present while 
victims are trapped within the hazard zone. As a result, first responders consistently 
lack the capability to accomplish combined missions when multiple threats are 
present. This thesis investigates the best way to fill this operational gap, first by 
examining the merits and limitations of several models related to the role of 
firefighters during hostile events. It then documents and analyzes the field tests of a 
fourth model piloted by the Houston Fire Department that would deploy cross-trained 
firefighting strike teams into hot zones with both incendiary and ballistic hazards. 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION .........................................................................1 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT .......................................................................1 
C. METHOD AND DESIGN .........................................................................3 
D. SIGNIFICANCE ........................................................................................4 
E. LIMITATIONS ..........................................................................................4 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION ......................................................................5 
II. BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................7
A. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................7 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................8 
1. Traditional Fire Service Role ........................................................9
2. Firefighters as Medical Rescue Task Forces and Tactical
Medics ...........................................................................................10 
3. Graduate Research ......................................................................14
4. Future Role as Tactical Firefighters ..........................................16
C. HISTORY .................................................................................................16 
1. Columbine .....................................................................................16
2. Rescue Task Forces ......................................................................18
3. The 2008 Mumbai Attacks ..........................................................19
4. Fire as a Weapon ..........................................................................21
III. TACTICAL FIREFIGHTER TEAMS: VISION AND CONCEPT ...............25
A. THE HOUSTON FIRE DEPARTMENT: HOUSTON, TEXAS ........25 
B. LOVELAND FIRE RESCUE AUTHORITY: LOVELAND, 
COLORADO ............................................................................................26 
C. CHARLOTTE FIRE DEPARTMENT: CHARLOTTE, NORTH 
CAROLINA ..............................................................................................28 
D. FIRE DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK ...................30 
E. LESSONS LEARNED FROM EARLY MODELS ..............................33 
F. REMAINING GAPS ................................................................................35 
IV. PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT NEEDS FOR TACTICAL
FIREFIGHTER ENTRY TEAMS .....................................................................39 
A. PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT ...............................................................40 
1. Structural Firefighter Turnout Gear .........................................41
2. Helmets, Boots, and Hoods ..........................................................41
viii 
3. Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus and Facepiece................42
4. Gloves ............................................................................................43
5. Ballistic Protection .......................................................................44
6. Thermal Imaging Cameras .........................................................46
V. HFD FIELD RESEARCH ...................................................................................49 















D. LESSONS LEARNED BY THE HFD....................................................67 
1. Finding #1: The 190 Pound Mannequin Was Not
Propelled through the Air ...........................................................68 
2. Finding #2: The SCBA Cylinder Did Not Explode when
Struck by Ammunition................................................................68 
3. Finding #3: Protective Equipment Must Work as a
Cohesive Ensemble.......................................................................69 
4. Finding #4: Handheld Thermal Imaging Cameras Are
Inadequate ....................................................................................73 
E. SUMMARY ..............................................................................................73 
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................75
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................75 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................78 
1. Develop Rescue Task Force Capabilities for All
Emergency Response Personnel .................................................78 
2. Incorporate Charlotte Fire Department’s and Loveland
Fire Rescue Authority’s Models to Assist Law
Enforcement Personnel ...............................................................78 
 ix 
3. Develop Special Operations Team for Response to Hostile 
Events ............................................................................................79 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH ............................................................................80 
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................81 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................85 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
BTHP  boat tail hollow point 
CBRNE  chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives  
CEU civil emergency unit 
CFD Charlotte Fire Department 
CMPD Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department 
CONTOMS counter narcotics tactical operations medical support 
CRC critical response command 
C-TECC Committee on Tactical Emergency Casualty Care 
EMS emergency medical services 
EMT emergency medical technician 
ESU emergency service unit 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FDNY Fire Department of the City of New York 
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Association 
HazMat  hazardous materials  
Haz-Tac  hazardous materials tactical 
HFD Houston Fire Department 
HPD  Houston Police Department 
HVAC  heating, ventilation, and air conditioning  
IAB  InterAgency Board 
IAFC International Association of Fire Chiefs 
IAFF International Association of Firefighters 
IARD  immediate action rapid deployment  
IDLH immediately dangerous to life and health 
IED improvised explosive device 
ITRT integrated tactical response teams 
LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba 
LFRA Loveland Fire Rescue Authority 
NFPA  National Fire Protection Association 
NIJ  National Institute of Justice 
xii 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NYPD New York Police Department 
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
PAC police assist company 
PASS personal alert safety system 
PPE personal protective equipment 
RTF rescue task force 
SCBA self-contained breathing apparatus 
SRG strategic response group 
SWARM syndicated, water-enabled, anti-siege response matrix 
SWAT special weapons and tactics 
TECC tactical emergency casualty care  
TEMS tactical emergency medical support 
TIC thermal imaging camera 
TPIA Texas Public Information Act 
TPP thermal protection performance  
USAR urban search and rescue 
 xiii 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Worldwide, terrorist attacks are becoming more tactically complex through the 
implementation of multiple attack modalities. To address the changing threat 
environment, first responders must actively consider alternative strategies to asymmetric 
attacks and acknowledge the need to place firefighters within a combined law 
enforcement and firefighter hot zone. While it is not yet common for fire to be effectively 
deployed by assailants to confuse and delay access to hostages and victims, public safety 
personnel need to be prepared to respond when fire is used as a weapon during a hostile 
event.  
This thesis examined the need for and utilization of tactical firefighter teams in 
the U.S. fire service to assist law enforcement during hostile events requiring combined 
fire and police skill sets to mitigate the incident. However, a significant limitation of the 
models involves the lack of inter-disciplinary use of protective equipment, which results 
in the inability of the responders to enter each other’s threat spaces safely. Therefore, 
while diverse skill sets are present in integrated teams, integrated equipment that would 
be appropriate to enter a multi-threat environment is lacking.  
Complex, multifaceted threats require not only a cross-disciplinary incident 
response by first responders, but also require the first responder to be equipped across 
disciplines. To address these gaps, the Houston Fire Department (HFD) has explored 
ways of introducing fire personnel into areas of direct threat by field testing adaptations 
to the protection ensembles worn by firefighters and police officers. Their findings 
support the concept of combining ballistic vests with structural firefighting bunker gear to 
engage in interior fire suppression during hostile events. The HFD model also proposed 
combining law enforcement rapid deployment tactics with firefighting tactics and the 
introduction of armed public safety personnel into areas where fire and smoke are 
present. This thesis evaluated HFD’s experimental efforts as they progress toward the 
implementation of their pilot program and synthesized Houston’s findings with lessons 
learned from other jurisdictions. This thesis recommended the implementation of a tiered 
deployment model for tactical fire teams responding to hostile events and proposed the 
xiv 
use of cross-trained firefighting strike teams trained and equipped to enter into hot zones 
in which incendiary and ballistic hazards are simultaneously deployed. The following 
recommendations for the implementation of tactical fire teams were made. 
Develop Rescue Task Force capabilities for all Emergency Response 
Personnel: The rescue task force model implemented by the Fire Department of the City 
of New York ensures rapid response to hostile events during the earliest stages. These 
units provide a large pool of personnel for less tactically complex tasks that still require 
firefighting skill sets. By combining with available police officers, these teams can 
provide fire, rescue, and emergency medical services support within warm zones. 
Incorporate Charlotte Fire Department’s and Loveland Fire Rescue 
Authority’s models to assist law enforcement personnel: Researchers have 
demonstrated that tactically complex tasks and complex motor skills require repetitive 
training to ingrain movement into the motor memory when under extreme stress.1 
Chaotic unstable environments can increase stress reactions that further contribute to the 
obstacles the operators must overcome. Designate specific personnel at fire stations to 
receive tactical training for incorporation into SWAT teams to support breaching 
activities, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives response, and gross 
decontamination during hostile events to include instances of civil unrest. Although these 
teams will be limited to warm zone operation, they will serve as a force multiplier 
especially when multiple venues are involved and resources will be spread throughout the 
area.  
Develop Special Operations Team for Response to Hostile Events: This thesis 
builds on existing tactical fire team models and offers an additional solution that takes 
advantage of the HFD’s arson investigation division. With experience in fighting fire and 
experience as law enforcement officers, members of the arson unit are uniquely situated 
to respond as either a strike team capable of fire suppression, law enforcement rapid 
deployment to neutralize armed assault, or as a force multiplier to augment the efforts of 
existing rescue task forces during hostile events. However, responding to hostile events 
1 Richard A. Schmidt and Craig A. Wrisberg, Motor Learning and Performance: A Situation-Based 
Learning Approach, 4th ed. (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 2008), 7. 
xv 
will require advanced skill sets with operators who can improvise when tactics or 
equipment fail. First units to enter must be autonomous and cross-disciplined since 
unknown threats can be encountered. The role of this special operations team would be to 
disentangle the threats sufficiently to allow traditional firefighting units to continue 
extinguishing the fire and traditional law enforcement units to continue searching for 
assailants. 
The tactical firefighter model is not to be viewed as a panacea but as an additional 
resource for the fire department in the event of a paramilitary attack. Sean Newman’s 
research demonstrated that “what is consistently absent from law enforcement 
preparations for a Mumbai-type terrorist event is the consideration of fire as part of the 
weapons mix.”2 This same lack of preparation is evident on the fire department side as 
well. By failing to consider the possibility of this type of assault, the responsibility of 
developing response strategies is left to the on-duty personnel who have little or no 
preparation to meet the demands of a rapidly unfolding paramilitary attack. The 
recommendation to deploy arson squad assets to terrorist attacks increases the capability 
of the HFD by providing additional skill sets from a workforce that has not historically 
been used in an emergency response setting. While it is not feasible to anticipate and 
develop responses to every single crisis, it is possible to increase the department’s 
capabilities to allow for greater adaptability in the midst of chaotic events. 
2 Sean Newman, “Braving the Swarm: Lowering Anticipated Group Bias in Integrated Fire/Police 
Units Facing Paramilitary Terrorism” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 37. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis addresses one question: What is the best way to implement tactical 
firefighter teams?  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Firefighters and police officers are increasingly called upon to work in each 
other’s spaces but are not trained nor equipped to do so; as a result, they are limited in 
their ability to enter one another’s high threat areas. During low-frequency, high-
consequence hostile events, this limitation can lead to delayed assistance to the public. In 
addition to the projectile and improvised explosive device (IED) hazards law 
enforcement may encounter when pursuing an assailant, fire complicates the police’s 
ability to respond by creating visibility issues, toxic fumes, thermal injuries from heat 
exposure, and blunt force trauma due to falling debris as the burning building 
deteriorates.1 Firefighters are equally ill-prepared to enter an environment in which fire 
and firearms are present while victims are trapped within the hazard zone. In general, first 
responders lack a cross-disciplined entry team to accomplish combined missions that 
challenge traditional, single-discipline response paradigms. 
Some early attempts have been made at developing tactical fire units to support 
law enforcement by embedding firefighters within SWAT or by creating ad hoc 
multidisciplinary teams.2 Much like tactical medics, these tactical firefighter teams 
attempt to fill operational gaps during complex, hostile events when a multidisciplinary 
approach is required to save lives. However, a major limitation of early tactical firefighter 
models is their reliance on the presence of SWAT teams for the deployment of fire assets; 
                                                 
1 Subcommittee Hearing: Protecting the Homeland Against Mumbai-Style Attacks and the Threat from 
Lashkar-E-Taiba Counterterrorism and Intelligence Subcommittee Counterterrorism (2013) (Statement by 
Assistant Chief Joseph W. Pfeifer Chief of Counterterrorism and Emergency Preparedness Fire Department 
of the City of New York). 
2 “Tactical Fire Team,” accessed March 17, 2016, http://www.cityofloveland.org/index.aspx?page= 
1864.  
2 
they do not attempt interior attacks to suppress fire, even with victims trapped inside, 
until and unless SWAT or law enforcement arrives.3 
The reliance on the presence of SWAT is inadequate to mitigate cross-
disciplinary threat environments with fire present. This inadequacy can prove 
problematic in situations in which the SWAT team has an extended response time; not all 
SWAT teams operate on a 24/7 basis. When incidents occur outside of the team’s regular 
working hours, SWAT arrival can be delayed for over an hour.4 Given the heavy use of 
synthetic furnishings within households today, a fire could easily progress to full 
structural involvement in less than five minutes, leaving little chance for survivors by the 
time SWAT arrives.5 Furthermore, most SWAT teams do not have an unlimited number 
of members; in the event that SWAT is committed at a different incident, insufficient 
SWAT personnel could be available to support the latest emergency.  
In today’s public safety sphere, budgets are tighter and missions are broader. As 
incidents have become more complex, collaboration and cross-training across police and 
fire roles is becoming compulsory. Some agencies have combined firefighters and police 
officers to create teams, but members are limited to the areas within which they are able 
to operate.6 The Loveland (Colorado) Fire Rescue Authority, the Charlotte Fire 
Department (CFD), and the Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) have 
implemented different models of tactical fire teams to support law enforcement 
operations. However, a significant limitation of the models involves the lack of inter-
disciplinary use of protective equipment, which results in the inability of the responders 
3 Loveland Fire Rescue Authority, General Operations Policy: Tactical Fire Team Operational Policy 
(Loveland, CO: Loveland Fire Rescue Authority, 2012), 1. 
4 John P. Giduck and Walter D. Chi, An Evaluation and Assessment of the Law Enforcement Tactical 
Response to the Virginia Tech University Shootings of Monday, 16 April 2007 (Golden, CO: Archangel 
Group, LTD., 2008), 108.  
5 Underwriters Laboratory, “Modern Residential Fires,” New Science Fire Safety Journal no. 1, 5, 
accessed May 30, 2016, http://newscience.ul.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NS_FS_Journal_Issue_ 
1.pdf. According to Underwriters Laboratory studies of modern fire progression, full room involvement can
occur within five minutes. 
6 FDNY Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness with International Partners, Interagency 
Tactical Response Model: Integrating Fire and EMS with Law Enforcement to Mitigate Mumbai-Style 
Terrorist Attacks (New York: FDNY Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness with International 
Partners, 2012), 4–7; Charlotte Fire Department, Tactical Operating Guideline: Active Violence Incident 
(Charlotte, NC: Charlotte Fire Department, 2014). 
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to enter each other’s threat spaces safely. Therefore, while diverse skill sets are present in 
integrated teams, integrated equipment that would be appropriate to enter a multi-threat 
environment is lacking.  
To address this gap, in 2015, the Houston Fire Department (HFD) began pilot 
testing a group of cross-trained and cross-equipped arson investigators to enter law 
enforcement and firefighter high threat areas in the absence of a SWAT or police 
department escort.7 The Houston pilot program is different than previous models, in that 
it challenges the boundaries of previous units by introducing armed firefighter strike 
teams into the hot zone who are capable of suppressing the fire and engaging active 
assailants.  
One of the challenges in conducting the research for this thesis involved the lack 
of published after action reports regarding the implementation of firefighter teams within 
a tactical, law enforcement environment. Within the fire service, formal evaluation for 
program effectiveness is not a customary practice outside of graduate research; generally, 
fire departments only produce after action reports following significant incidents to 
capture lessons learned. The results of the Houston tests are described and evaluated in 
this thesis with the purpose of using it as the basis to propose a new template for cross-
disciplined tactical first responder teams. 
C. METHOD AND DESIGN 
This thesis is a study of tactical firefighter teams in the United States. It describes 
and evaluates existing and emerging teams, in particular, the development and the 
equipment field testing of the most self-sufficient team to date, that of the Houston Fire 
Department’s, which attempts to pick up where other jurisdictions have left off. In 2015, 
the HFD program began as a series of field tests in an attempt to use a formalized 
methodology to assess the value and feasibility of creating a tactical firefighter program 
before committing substantial resources. This type of research provides a way for 
                                                 
7 Houston Fire Department, internal memo, August 3, 2015. 
4 
products and services to transition from idea to implementation in a more cost effective 
and efficacious manner by allowing for experimentation and shifts in strategy.8 
This thesis evaluates HFD’s experimental efforts as they progress toward the 
implementation of their pilot program and synthesizes Houston’s findings with lessons 
learned from other jurisdictions to offer recommendations for a new model. The field-
testing discussed was conducted during the regular course of my duties. Although the 
results have not yet been published by the HFD, written permission was obtained from 
the department head to release the findings and field notes for the purpose of this study.9 
When applicable, reference is made to original field notes and memos. In their absence, 
the author will report the findings herself since she conducted the testing as part of her 
employment with HFD. While this thesis reports HFD’s findings, it does not serve as 
HFD’s sole vehicle for reporting the findings of their program. Instead, this thesis seeks 
to prove the value of tactical fire teams as a new core fire service capability.  
D. SIGNIFICANCE 
This thesis contributes to the existing research by offering recommendations on 
how a tactical team should be implemented. The HFD model picks up from earlier 
models and goes further in that it does not rely on linking up with SWAT nor does it rely 
on an external law enforcement escort for firefighter entry into a multi-hazard 
environment. Ultimately, it will build on previous practices by combining methods and 
makes recommendations toward policy steps with the goal of creating a national-scale 
use of this model. 
E. LIMITATIONS 
At the onset of this research, the author made a deliberate decision to use only 
written documentation exclusively and not to rely on surveys and interviews. In 
retrospect, that decision created substantial challenges in obtaining information since so 
much of the available information has not been captured in departmental reports. The 
8 Deborah J. Bowen et al., “How We Design Feasibility Studies,” American Journal of Preventive 
Medicine 36, no. 5 (2009): 452–457, doi:10.1016/j.amepre.2009.02.002.  
9 The unpublished notes and memos are available via an open records request to the department. 
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ability to interview industry experts could have provided a more complete picture of the 
thought processes and implementation challenges that rarely make it into reports. While 
the available reports provided what decisions were made by specific departments, the 
context for those decisions was not recorded in any of the available documents. 
Therefore, it is known what their programs looked like, but not why they were shaped in 
the manner that they were. Future researchers should consider incorporation of surveys 
and interviews of industry leaders who have implemented tactical fire teams to provide a 
more complete picture of the process and to offer valuable insight to the obstacles faced 
by other departments as they formed their programs.  
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter identifies the scope and 
purpose of the research, and summarizes the design and significance of the thesis. 
Chapter II discusses the literature and provides context for the research conducted. 
Chapter III describes the vision and concept for tactical fire teams with a description of 
early models for tactical fire teams in the United States. Chapter IV analyzes the 
protective equipment needs for a tactical fire team. Chapter V discusses and evaluates the 
HFD’s field studies in their development of a tactical fire team. Chapter VI consists of 
recommendations and conclusions. 
  
6 




Historical events have revealed the inadequacies of the American fire service’s 
“stage and wait” response paradigm during hostile events in which firefighters and police 
officers must coordinate their responses.10 In addition to law enforcement’s mission of 
neutralizing the assailants, several traditional fire and EMS activities must often occur 
simultaneously to successfully mitigate the threat. Although rare, activities, such as 
breaching, fire suppression, rescues, and medical services at the point of wounding, may 
be required by the initial responders within areas of gunfire or direct threat. This chapter 
discusses the role of tactical medics and rescue task forces, identifies the limitations of 
current strategies used by firefighters for rescue and response to an unstable hostile 
environment, and advocates for the need to adapt to dynamic threats further.  
The American fire service was originally developed to protect people and their 
property from fires.11 Since its colonial beginnings, the service has maintained its core 
mission of protecting life and property but has adopted and expanded its capabilities to 
the needs of the community it serves. It has become increasingly the norm during the last 
50 years as modernization and industrialization have led to larger, denser urban areas. In 
addition to fighting fires, core services performed by firefighters now include emergency 
medical services, hazardous materials response, technical rescue, and response to civil 
unrest and terrorist incidents. The fire service continues to face an ever-changing threat 
environment and must regularly adapt its strategies to protect life and property within 
dynamic incidents at much earlier stages than previously practiced. Emergencies that in 
their early stages historically focused on response by law enforcement increasingly 
                                                 
10 State of Colorado, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’ Columbine Review Commission (State of 
Colorado, 2001), 23.  
11 Paul C. Ditzel, Fire Engines, Fire Fighters: The Men, Equipment, and Machines, From Colonial 
Days to the Present (New York: Bonanza Books, distributed by Crown Publishers, 1984). 
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require a coordinated response by police, fire, and emergency medical services (EMS) 
providers.12  
Worldwide, events—particularly those with a terrorist nexus—are becoming more 
tactically complex. Hostile events like the ones that occurred in Mumbai, Paris, and 
Orlando demonstrate the need for emergency responders to review their strategies 
periodically and make modifications. During the last five decades, firefighters have 
increasingly responded to terrorist incidents; however, as a whole, the American fire 
service has been slow to incorporate new strategies to those evolving threats.13 Since the 
9/11 attacks, fire departments can no longer ignore that response to terrorist assaults, and 
hostile events are the new normal and have become a core service for firefighters. 
Whether the assault is internationally or domestically motivated matters little to the 
American public; the community and elected officials expect their fire departments to 
take calculated risks to fulfill their primary mission of saving lives.14  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this review is to examine the available literature regarding the fire 
service’s tactical role during incidents in which a combined police and fire 
multidisciplinary approach would expedite first responder mission objectives of 
increasing the survivability for hostages and victims. Aside from graduate research, little 
relevant scholarly literature pertains to the role of firefighters in support of law 
enforcement activities during tactical operations involving suppression activities; most of 
the existing research focuses on the medical response. Noticeably absent from the 
literature is a review of active threats requiring fire suppression in the midst of an armed 
assault. This literature review examines the past, present, and future roles of firefighters 
in support of law enforcement tactical incidents.  
12 Department of Homeland Security, First Responder Guide for Improving Survivability in 
Improvised Explosive Device and/or Active Shooter Incidents (Washington, DC: Office of Health Affairs, 
2015), 15. 
13 Michael Marino et al., “To Save Lives and Property: High Threat Response,” Homeland Security 




1. Traditional Fire Service Role 
Since the 1999 mass killing at Columbine High School, various federal agencies 
have published guidance suggesting first responder disciplines (fire, EMS, and police) 
work more closely together during mass shootings and terrorist attacks.15 Fire service 
practitioners have been slow to operationalize the vague recommendations.16 Since 2010, 
a growing body of literature, produced by first responders, has advocated for the 
formation of multidisciplinary task forces that combine the capabilities of firefighters, 
EMS personnel, and police officers to rescue injured victims. One of the most important 
works to date was authored by a group of experts within the medical, EMS, and fire 
communities. According to Marino et al., public outcry following the tragedy at 
Columbine High School caused a paradigm shift for law enforcement agencies but did 
not result in strategic changes for firefighters and EMS.17 The authors contend that 
before that event, police officers responding to hostage crises, shootings, and terrorist 
events employed a set of protocols known as the five “Cs”: “contain, control, 
communicate, call SWAT, and create a plan.”18 The authors further assert that although 
law enforcement altered its long-standing tactics in favor of aggressively pursuing the 
shooter, the fire service did not change its traditional “stage and wait” model, with most 
fire departments continuing to maintain this protocol.19 As a result, firefighters place 
their own safety above the needs and expectations of the public they are sworn to serve 
by staging at a safe distance until the police provide assurance that the scene is 
completely safe.20 To adapt to the dynamic threat environment increasingly encountered 
by first responders, the authors proposed the formation of integrated medical response 
teams composed of firefighters, EMTs and police officers to rescue injured victims while 
law enforcement contact teams pursue and eliminate the shooter. Although their 
                                                 
15 United States Fire Administration and Tridata Corporation, Wanton Violence at Columbine High 
School, April 20, 1999: Special Report (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1999), 
35, https://books.google.com/books?id=AFecjgEACAAJ. 
16 Marino et al., “To Save Lives and Property: High Threat Response.”  
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid.  
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recommended guidelines are rooted in successful military battlefield principles, the 
authors acknowledged several reasons the fire service has failed to institutionalize an 
integrated medical response model to high-casualty, high-threat incidents involving 
firearms: firefighter perception that the incident is exclusively law enforcement’s 
responsibility, firefighter attitude toward acceptable risk, and the historical mission of the 
fire service. The most salient characteristic of the work is that it addresses and counters 
many of the common arguments posed by fire and EMS personnel who resist the rescue 
task force model as a new fire service core capability during mass casualty incidents. 
Scholarly writing providing a counter-argument to Marino et al. is nonexistent. Dissent to 
their proposal can be measured via the overwhelming lack of implementation throughout 
the nation’s fire departments of the framework they propose. 
2. Firefighters as Medical Rescue Task Forces and Tactical Medics
A significant portion of the literature discusses the role of firefighters as pre-
hospital care rescuers. This position has been accepted by the International Association of 
Fire Chiefs (IAFC) and the International Association of Firefighters (IAFF) as a core fire 
service capability.21 Since the creation of SWAT teams in the 1960s, major urban fire 
departments have incorporated paramedics and EMTs within the police’s SWAT team to 
support tactical operations. The earliest version of SWAT medics was among law 
enforcement personnel who were trained in trauma care. While some SWAT units 
continue to prefer this model, alternative iterations have emerged to incorporate 
experienced emergency medical services personnel with supplemental training in tactical 
team movement.22 Regardless of the route by which the medics were trained, their 
primary mission remains the same, to care for injured SWAT members.23 However, the 
SWAT medic model was never intended for the care of mass casualties resulting from 
21 International Association of Firefighters, IAFF Position Statement: Active Shooter Events (Fairfax, 
VA: International Association of Firefighters, 2013), http://www.iaff.org/Comm/PDFs/IAFF_Active_ 
Shooter_Position_Statement.pdf. 
22 National Tactical Officers Association, Tactical Response and Operations Standard for Law 
Enforcement Agencies (Doylestown, PA: National Tactical Officers Association, 2015), 25. 
23 Marino et al., “To Save Lives and Property: High Threat Response.” 
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active shooters or terrorist attacks. Following several mass shootings with high injury 
counts, the concept of the rescue task force emerged.24  
The most comprehensive document to date recommending rescue task forces was 
published by the Department of Homeland Security.25 The document recommends the 
formation of rescue task forces composed of firefighters and police officers to rescue as 
many victims as possible before the police have completely secured and searched the 
building.26 Although not statutorily required, federal guidance clearly advocates for the 
introduction of firefighters into an area traditionally considered off limits to non-law 
enforcement personnel to maximize the likelihood that victims will survive a mass 
casualty or terrorist event.27 The ideas presented in the document have been previously 
proposed by various industry experts during the last five years; however, this document 
consolidates many of the recommendations to a single comprehensive source.  
While no scholarly literature per se exists on the use of armed tactical medics 
outside of the military environment, the literature does describe a few notable civilian fire 
departments and EMS agencies that have adopted a practice that might be considered a 
precedent for using armed firefighter teams within the hot zone traditionally restricted to 
law enforcement officers. A 2010 Fire-Rescue International Conference lecture by 
Sheriff K. Kimbrough and Battalion Chief B. Lowe describes a successful 
multidisciplinary program in which firefighters from Clayton County Fire and 
Emergency Services in Georgia support the SWAT team and seems to make the first 
argument for this kind of role among firefighter paramedics.28 They reported that Clayton 
County’s SWAT team was best served by cross-training firefighter and paramedics as 
police officers and cited several incidents in which the armed firefighter-medic was 
                                                 
24 E. Reed Smith, Blake Iselin, and W. Sean McKay, “Toward the Sound of Shooting: Arlington, VA, 
Rescue Task Force Represents a New Medical Response Model to Active Shooter Incidents,” Journal of 
Emergency Medical Services 34, no. 12 (2009): 49–55. 
25 Department of Homeland Security, First Responder Guide for Improving Survivability in 
Improvised Explosive Device and/or Active Shooter Incidents. 
26 Ibid., 15. 
27 Ibid., 19.  
28 Kem Kimbrough and Bill Lowe, “Armed and Deputized Tactical Medics,” presentation at the Fire-
Rescue International Conference, Chicago, IL: August 24–28, 2010. 
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necessary to the success of the mission.29 Clayton County tactical medics are embedded 
with the entry team and provide care under fire to local police, sheriffs, and U.S. 
Marshals upon request from law enforcement. The medics routinely train to perform 
within the technically complicated, high-risk environment encountered by tactical 
officers, such as “low light conditions and chaotic scenes contributing to sensory 
overload.”30 The medics are also equipped with traditional law enforcement gear, 
ballistic vests and firearms. Another innovation in the tactical medic model used in 
Clayton County was the ability of the firefighter and medics to respond to exterior 
structure fires for suppression duties when escorted by special weapons and tactics 
(SWAT).31 It is important because it fills an operational gap in which firefighting skills 
within a police incident are required; however, the authors reported the tactical medics 
are limited in their ability to enter a burning structure since the police cannot protect them 
inside the burning structure. For non-fire related emergencies, the medics are required to 
wear and deploy their firearm if needed to protect themselves or their patients.32  
Although the practice of providing care under fire has not gained widespread 
national support, a 2010 article in Fire Chief magazine reported a similar type of tactical 
medic program in Palm Bay, Florida in which firefighter paramedics are cross-trained as 
medical support for SWAT members.33 According to the article, the medics are trained 
and certified as auxiliary police officers able to enter into the police hot zone to assist 
injured victims and seem to support the program created in Clayton County, Georgia.34 
The firefighters assist with breaching and rescue of patients, but cannot enter to 
extinguish a fire because of law enforcement’s inability to provide force protection in a 
heated environment.  








The framework upon which these and other tactical medical response programs 
are based was developed by a group of trauma care experts known as the Committee on 
Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (C-TECC). In a 2011 article, members of the C-TECC 
described a three-tiered medical response at high threat incidents.35 According to 
Callaway et al., the riskiest tactical response occurs during the first-tier, direct threat, or 
“care under fire.”36 While the authors would not require firefighters and EMS providers 
to provide rescue during an armed assault, they specifically state that it is a possibility 
that can be considered under certain extreme circumstances.37 It is a new concept and not 
accepted by labor organizations within the fire service, such as the IAFC, which support 
limited entry into a police environment, the warm zone, yet not in areas with direct threat, 
known as the hot zone.38 The authors assert that “C-TECC guidelines provide an 
operational cost benefit model that allows all first responder practitioners with a means to 
balance the risk of intervention against the benefit of rescue.”39 The article focuses on the 
appropriate level of medical intervention during hostile events and does not discuss the 
arming of medics or firefighters one way or the other.  
A recurring theme of the literature is that in the absence of a SWAT or law 
enforcement escort, firefighting units should not attempt to suppress the fire or respond to 
injured victims. Much like the tactical medic, the tactical firefighter teams described are 
an attempt to fill operational gaps in the midst of complex hostile incidents where a 
                                                 
35 David Callaway et al., “Tactical Emergency Casualty Care: Guidelines for the Provision of Pre-
Hospital Trauma Care in High Threat Environments,” Journal of Special Operations Medicine 11, no. 3, 
(2011): 106.  
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 104–122. 
38 Fire Department of the City of New York, Interagency Tactical Response Model: Integrating Fire 
and EMS with Law Enforcement to Mitigate Mumbai-Style Terrorist Attacks, 2; International Association 
of Firefighters, IAFF Position Statement: Active Shooter Events. The development of the concept of hazard 
zones arose out of a hazardous material response. Zones help operators define areas of risk, and are helpful 
for the traditional fire and rescue response. Threat designations for terrorist incidents are categorized as hot, 
warm, and cold zones, “A hot zone is an area where terrorists, or other actors are present, either roaming 
free or engaged by law enforcement. IED’s may be present. No fire suppression personnel or emergency 
medical service personnel are permitted to operate in areas designated as hot zones. The warm zone is an 
area that has been cleared by law enforcement with no identifiable suspects or improvised explosive device 
threats. The cold zone is the area that law enforcement has confirmed as free of threats.”  
39 Callaway et al., “Tactical Emergency Casualty Care: Guidelines for the Provision of Pre-Hospital 
Trauma Care in High Threat Environments,” 113. 
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multidisciplinary approach is required to save lives. Although criticism of the tactical 
firefighter paradigm does not appear in the literature, a lack of support is also evident, 
and adoption for this response is extremely limited. 
3. Graduate Research
Several master’s theses have been written by experts within the first responder 
community addressing the role of firefighters during tactical police operations. In his 
2011 Naval Postgraduate School Master’s thesis, firefighter Sean Newman proposes the 
use of a small elite inter-agency unit of pre-first responders—composed of firefighters 
and police officers—to enter hostile zones to engage terrorists, suppress the fire, and 
rescue hostages.40 He recognizes the predicament facing firefighters and police officers 
when confronted with a dynamic attack, “Currently, compartmented standard operating 
procedures for first responders do not adequately address active shooter terrorist attacks 
when fire and explosives are combined with conventional firearms.”41 Known as a 
syndicated, water-enabled, anti-siege response matrix (SWARM), this elite response 
group would enter as a pre-strike team to stabilize the threat environment sufficiently to 
allow other officers to enter the structure and continue clearing the building.42 In another 
2011 Naval Postgraduate School Master’s thesis, Battalion Chief Paul Atwater, a veteran 
firefighter, advocates the use of “a force protection model in which law enforcement 
officers accompany and protect fire fighters in the warm zone.”43 Atwater’s proposal 
focuses on the use of first responder task forces specifically for the extrication of victims 
found in the warm zone. His proposal shares several operational similarities with the 
subsequent recommendations made by the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal 
40 Sean Newman, “Braving the Swarm: Lowering Anticipated Group Bias in Integrated Fire/Police 
Units Facing Paramilitary Terrorism” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 43. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Paul A. Atwater, “Force Protection for Fire Fighters: Warm Zone Operations at Paramilitary Style 
Active Shooter Incidents in a Multi-Hazard Environment as a Fire Service Core Competency” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 9. 
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Emergency Management Agency, the IAFC, and the IAFF to increase the survivability of 
the victims.44  
Theodore Moody’s research supports not cross-training across disciplines, but 
rather, a task force with specialists from different first responder disciplines to 
complement one another. Moody cautions against the reliance on SWAT units in active 
shooter and paramilitary assault incidents, asserting their historic extended response 
times would further risk the hostages’ safety.45 Instead, he recommends integrated teams 
consisting of “first first responders,” on-duty patrol officers and firefighters, with the 
tactical objective of quickly neutralizing the terrorists to stop the killing of hostages and 
to suppress the fire as necessary.46 To date, no fire department has implemented Moody’s 
integrated team recommendation.  
Deputy Fire Chief Keith Johnson’s thesis examines the need for public agencies 
to implement integrated plans across multiple disciplines and justifies the need for cross-
disciplined teams to coordinate at the response level, “To safely and efficiently mitigate 
emergent complex, paramilitary events, and encourage the collaboration of police, fire 
and EMS agencies, first responders should incorporate response frameworks to include 
strategic and operational policies that are compatible with each other, and align with their 
respective cultures.”47 Johnson argues that the mere creation of departmental policies 
supporting fire and law enforcement integration will not be sufficient; coordinated 
incident action plans deployed at the line level by the end-users—the first arriving patrol 
                                                 
44 International Association of Firefighters, IAFF Position Statement: Active Shooter Events; 
International Association of Fire Chiefs, Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Terrorist Events (Fairfax, VA: 
International Association of Firefighters, 2013), http://www.iafc.org/files/1ASSOC/IAFCPosition_Active 
ShooterEvents.pdf, and Office of Health Affairs; Department of Homeland Security, First Responder 
Guide to Improving Survivability in Improvised Explosive Device and/or Active Shooter Incidents, 9. 
45 Theodore Moody, “Filling the Gap between NIMS/ICS and the Law Enforcement Initial Response 
in the Age of the Urban Jihad” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 44. 
46 Ibid., 48. 
47 Keith Johnson, “Changing the Paradigm: Implementation of Combined, Law Enforcement, Fire, and 
Emergency Medical Service (EMS) Cross-Disciplinary Response to Hostile Events” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2014), 1. 
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officers and firefighters—are key components to successful integrated public safety 
responses during complex hostile events.48 
4. Future Role as Tactical Firefighters
Theodore Moody presents the only counter-argument cautioning against the over-
reliance on SWAT teams for incidents in which multidisciplinary first responder 
integration is needed to protect the public.49 The literature demonstrates a need for 
ongoing dialogue to seek solutions related to interior fire suppression during active 
shooting and terrorist events so that hostages can be rescued. What seems to be missing 
from the majority of the literature is the recognition that internationally, armed terrorist 
attacks are more dynamic and more unpredictable than typical American active shooter 
incidents; hot zones and warm zones will not remain static during an incident. Incidents 
can be dynamic particularly when multiple assailants conduct simultaneous attacks and 
employ additional weapons, such as IEDs and fire. 
C. HISTORY 
Several historical events illustrate the need to reevaluate alternative first 
responder strategies for response to asymmetric attacks and demonstrate the necessity of 
placing firefighters within a combined law enforcement and firefighter hot zone. In 
addition, a review of American news reveals that not all asymmetric attacks involve mass 
casualties and therefore do not attract nationwide news coverage. While it is not yet 
common for fire to be effectively deployed by assailants to confuse and delay access to 
hostages and victims, public safety personnel need to be prepared to respond when fire is 
used as a weapon during a hostile event. 
1. Columbine
Although not considered a terrorist attack, the April 20, 1999 assault at 
Columbine High School in Colorado was a watershed moment in public safety. On that 
48 Johnson, “Changing the Paradigm: Implementation of Combined, Law Enforcement, Fire, and 
Emergency Medical Service (EMS) Cross-Disciplinary Response to Hostile Events,” 69. 
49 Moody, “Filling the Gap between NIMS/ICS and the Law Enforcement Initial Response in the Age 
of the Urban Jihad,” 47. 
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day, two teenagers mounted a multi-hazard attack at a high school using small arms and 
76 homemade IEDs.50 Their initial plan was to cause an explosion and fire in the 
cafeteria by detonating two 20-pound propane bombs and to shoot the fleeing 
survivors.51 The plan failed, but by later shooting at the propane bombs, the teens 
managed to start a small fire in the cafeteria that caused the sprinkler system to 
activate.52 Computer modeling suggests that had the propane bombs detonated, the 
resulting fireball and explosion would have killed and severely injured the students in the 
cafeteria that day.53 During the assault, the perpetrators successfully detonated 30 of their 
incendiary and explosive devices before committing suicide.54 Approximately 1.5 hours 
after the first shots were fired, SWAT requested firefighting assets to extinguish the fire 
in the cafeteria. An ad hoc firefighting task force composed of firefighters willing to 
volunteer for the hazardous duty assignment was formed to develop an action plan to 
address the possibility of additional fire spread.55 In total, 13 people were killed and 24 
were wounded through the assailants’ combined use of fire, IEDs, handguns, and long 
guns.  
Among the after action reports generated following the attack at Columbine High 
School, the United States Fire Administration published “Wanton Violence at Columbine 
High School.”56 The report made several recommendations for strategic changes within 
the fire service. The findings cited the failure of using “stage and wait” protocols for 
                                                 
50 United States Fire Administration, Wanton Violence at Columbine High School, Technical Report 
Series (Washington, DC: United States Fire Administration, 1999), 25–26.  
51 Ibid., 10. 
52 Ibid., 11–12; State of Colorado, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’ Columbine Review 
Commission, 23; The report documented a total of 99 incendiary explosive device: 13 additional IEDs were 
found in or around the assailants’ cars, eight unexploded bombs were discovered in their homes, and two 
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53 Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office, Report on the Columbine High School Shootings: Law 
Enforcement, Fire/EMS Agencies Responding to Columbine High School Shootings (Evergreen, CO: 
Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office, 1999); “Cover Letter from Sheriff John P. Stone,” May 15, 2000, 
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Administration, Wanton Violence at Columbine High School, 35. 
54 United States Fire Administration, Wanton Violence at Columbine High School, 1. 
55 Ibid., 18–21. 
56 United States Fire Administration, Wanton Violence at Columbine High School. 
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SWAT and waiting for complete “all-clears” from law enforcement. The report suggested 
the formation of police officer, and firefighter, and EMT teams to rescue the injured for 
more rapid medical intervention.57 
As a result, law enforcement agencies across the country adapted their tactics 
from waiting for SWAT to confront the assailant, to deploying the first arriving police 
officers rapidly to engage the shooter and stop the victims from dying.58 Fire and EMS 
agencies, however, continued with their stage and wait protocols.59 It would take years 
for fire departments to begin changing their response models to the increasingly lethal 
active shooter and mass casualty incidents that have become a regular occurrence across 
America. Following a 2009 full-scale exercise that resulted in an unacceptably delayed 
EMS response during a mass casualty, the nationwide efforts to develop integrated 
protocols for coordinated EMS and law enforcement teams were led by Arlington 
County, Virginia.60  
2. Rescue Task Forces
Arlington’s development and implementation of the Rescue Task Force model 
resulted after a 2009 full-scale exercise that revealed response gaps in Arlington’s mass 
casualty response model.61 The after action report uncovered several limitations 
exacerbated by the exclusive reliance on SWAT teams and SWAT medics to mitigate 
active shooter events and treat the wounded. What resulted was the rescue task force 
(RTF) concept in which law enforcement provides armed protection to firefighters and 
emergency medical personnel while they rescue the injured. RTFs differ from tactical 
medics in that line firefighters and patrol officers form combined teams at the incident 
57 United States Fire Administration, Wanton Violence at Columbine High School, 18–21. 
58 Katherine W. Schweit, “Addressing the Problem of the Active Shooter,” FBI Law Enforcement 
Bulletin, May 2013, https://leb.fbi.gov/2013/may/addressing-the-problem-of-the-active-shooter; Illinois 
State Police Academy, Rapid Deployment as a Response to an Active Shooter Incident (Springfield, IL: 
Illinois State Police Academy, 2003), 4. 
59 J. Pete Blair and M. Hunter Martaindale, United States Active Shooter Events from 2000 to 2010: 
Training and Equipment Implications (San Marcos, TX: Texas State University, 2013). 
60  Smith, Iselin, and McKay, “Toward the Sound of Shooting: Arlington, VA, Rescue Task Force 
Represents a New Medical Response Model to Active Shooter Incidents,” 49–55.  
61 Ibid. 
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and do not wait for SWAT to arrive. The police provide force protection in the warm 
zone while firefighters and EMS personnel extricate victims out of the hazard zone. This 
concept was initially slow to be accepted and implemented around the country but has 
gained momentum after support from the IAFF, the IAFC, and the International 
Association of Police Chiefs. It has gained national support from the Federal Emergency 
Management Association (FEMA), and while it is not mandatory, it has developed into 
an industry standard.62 The public has come to expect this level of intervention, yet 
despite the support for the model, some fire departments have been slow to implement 
the RTF concept within their jurisdictions.63  
Key takeaways from Arlington’s RTF protocols involve creating teams of two to 
three police officers—front and rear guards—paired with several firefighters and EMTs 
to assist the victims. Arlington’s protocols also recommend providing firefighter RTF 
members with ballistic protection (rifle plates) and Kevlar helmets. The police officers 
escort the firefighters or EMTs into the warm zones where no direct threat is present, 
although the area has not been searched to the extent that police have declared it 
completely clear of all potential hazards. While this model has demonstrated success in 
active shooter environments, it does not consider the introduction of fire into the threat 
mix, and therefore, has limitations in its application.  
3. The 2008 Mumbai Attacks 
The quintessential paramilitary attack involving the inclusion of fire into the 
threat environment occurred in 2008, when 10 heavily armed members of Lashkar-e-
Taiba (LeT) conducted multiple coordinated assaults of soft targets in Mumbai, India, 
including a restaurant, a hotel, and the train station. The attackers combined the use of 
assault rifles, hand grenades, IEDs, and fire while holding dozens of hostages. 
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Ultimately, the three-day assault resulted in the deaths of 166 people and the wounding of 
over 300 victims.64  
Using conventional low-tech attack methods, the attackers were able to 
effectively delay the first responders because of the latter’s failure to prepare for a 
multiple modality attack. Intercepted conversations between the attackers and their 
handlers indicated that within four hours of taking the Taj Mahal Hotel, the attackers set 
several fires to create chaos inside and attract media attention.65 Due to the hostage 
component and the number of heavily armed, trained terrorists, the Mumbai attack was 
more reminiscent of an urban warfare scenario than the active shooter event typically 
seen in the United States.66 The assault involved taking numerous hostages with no intent 
of releasing them, leading to large numbers of casualties.  
Iconic news footage captured the efforts of fire personnel raising ladders to rescue 
hostages from balconies who were hanging from windows of the Taj Mahal hotel during 
the siege.67 Despite the absence of strategies, equipment, and tactics, the responding 
police officers and firefighters repeatedly risked their lives and did the best they could 
with what their departments had provided them. Similarly, firefighters and EMTs 
improvised while exposed to gunfire and grenades, borrowing ballistic vests, and 
evacuating injured police officers from the multiple attack locations.68  
Catastrophic incidents, such as Mumbai, demonstrate the unforeseen complexity 
facing first responders, far transcending the hazards and injuries typically encountered by 
the emergency response community in the United States. This seminal event 
64 Shahrzad Rizvi and Joshua Kelly, “The Continued Relevance of the November 2008 Mumbai 
Terrorist Attack: Countering New Attacks with Old Lessons,” Homeland Security Affairs 11, art. 6, June 
2015, 2. 
65 “Mumbai Terrorist Attacks Report: November 26–29, 2008,” July 6, 2009, 52–53, http://www. 
investigativeproject.org/documents/277-mumbai-terror-attacks-dossier-of-evidence.pdf.  
66 Simon O’Rourke, The Emergency Challenges for Policing Terrorism: Lessons from Mumbai,” in 
Proceedings of the 1st Australian Counter Terrorism Conference (Edith Cowan University, Perth Western 
Australia, 2010), 46. 
67 “Unnoticed Heroes on Mumbai Attacks: Fire Fighters,” November 29, 2008, http://www.indian 
express.com/story-print/392212/; Subcommittee Hearing: Protecting the Homeland against Mumbai-Style 
Attacks and the Threat from Lashkar-E-Taiba (2013) (Assistant Fire Chief Joseph W. Pfeifer). 
68 “Unnoticed Heroes on Mumbai Attacks: Fire Fighters.” 
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demonstrated the need for police and firefighters to coordinate their tactics, strategies, 
and equipment for incidents involving shooting and fires simultaneously taking place to 
rescue hostages and victims. 
Terrorism scholar Brian Jenkins states that a successfully executed “Mumbai-
style attack is conceivable in the United States,” despite the fact that several plots have 
been foiled since 9/11.69 In addition to international terrorists, homegrown violent 
extremists have engendered a sustained level of right-wing inspired domestic terrorism.70 
To date, lone attackers have overwhelmingly executed most of these assaults; however, 
“leaderless resistance” doctrine that inspires right-wing and left-wing extremists also 
advocates for attacks by small cells of no more than six attackers, more than enough 
individuals to carry out a Mumbai-style assault.71 Although responders have consistently 
neglected to develop the strategies necessary to respond to this attack method, the use of 
fire as a weapon is actually an ancient technique. 
4. Fire as a Weapon 
Humans have a long history of using fire in warfare. In the fifth century B.C., Sun 
Tzu devoted an entire chapter in his military treatise, The Art of War, to the strategy of 
attacking the enemy with incendiary weapons.72 He described the tactical advantage 
gained by attacking once the flames reached their height and the confusion faced by the 
unprepared enemy. The tactic of using fire as a weapon was effectively demonstrated by 
the United States armed forces during WWII, which resulted in the deadliest air raid of 
the war. On March 9, 1945, 339 B-29 bombers rained over 1,500 tons of firebombs on 
Tokyo using white phosphorous and napalm. About 15 square miles were destroyed, an 
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area half the size of Manhattan. Civilian fatalities were estimated at 130,000 and over one 
million inhabitants were injured. In addition, 63% of Tokyo’s commercial area and 18% 
of its industrial base was destroyed.73 While the attacks of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have 
dominated history, the firebombing of Tokyo accounted for more civilian deaths in Japan 
than the atomic bombs used a few months later.74 
The Columbine and Mumbai attacks are not the only recent instances in which 
fire has effectively been used as a weapon against civilian targets. In the 2012 Benghazi 
attack, U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens and Information Officer Sean Smith died 
not from traumatic injuries, but from smoke inhalation as the compound burned.75 The 
use of fire and firearms is not limited to large-scale events; occurrences of arson 
combined with shooting often fail to make national news, yet may be happening more 
frequently than might be assumed. News outlets in Philadelphia reported that on May 18, 
2016, a teenager was lured outside when a Molotov cocktail was thrown on his front 
porch, starting a fire. When he went outside to investigate, he was shot multiple times.76 
Several people were inside the home at the time of the assault. On September 24, 2015, in 
Arkansas, two assailants firebombed a home and shot the 12 occupants as they fled the 
fire.77 On April 11, 2016, a SWAT standoff in Clintonville, Ohio resulted in a gunfight 
with police, the shooting death of a police officer, and an apartment fire when the 
barricaded suspect refused to surrender.78  
In a guide published by the nation’s leading homeland security practitioners, fire 
was identified as an effective means of attacking responders and citizens during hostile 
73 Edwin P. Hoyt, Inferno: The Fire Bombing of Japan, March 9–August 15, 1945 (Lanham, MD: 
Madison Books, 2000), 40–48. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Lateef Mungin, “Benghazi Siege: The Ambassador’s Last Minutes,” December 19, 2012, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/19/us/benghazi-what-happened/. 
76 Dan Stamm, “Porch Arson Leads to Shooting of Teenager,” NBC Philadelphia, May 19, 2016, 
http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Lebanon-Avenue-Arson-Shooting-379919241.html. 
77 Curt Lanning, “Update: Arrest in Helena Arson-Shooting,” fox16, September 24, 2015, 
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events to delay the emergency response or to create confusion.79 As this nation’s threat 
environment evolves, public safety organizations must recognize the needs of the 
communities they are sworn to protect and change as well. The literature confirms that 
new strategies, techniques, and service models should be adopted. Although the fire 
service as a whole has been slow to embrace its mission within traditional law 
enforcement incidents, some fire service organizations are leading the industry and have 
implemented new response models.  
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III. TACTICAL FIREFIGHTER TEAMS: VISION AND CONCEPT
During its research of tactical firefighter teams, the HFD found a few examples of 
active teams throughout the country. This chapter describes the vision and concept for 
three of the industry’s tactical fire team pioneers: Loveland Fire Rescue Authority, the 
CFD, and the FDNY. In light of the emerging complexity of the threat environment, and 
the need for coordinated public safety strategies, these fire service organizations have 
implemented variations of tactical firefighter (“Tac Fire”) teams to assist law 
enforcement personnel during hostile events. In establishing the Tac Fire program, the 
Loveland Fire Rescue Authority has provided a possible mitigation strategy for hostile 
incidents requiring firefighting services in the midst of a law enforcement incident. 
Firefighters who are members of the Tac Fire Team provide suppression expertise and 
support for the SWAT team. Meanwhile, law enforcement members of the SWAT team 
provide armed protection to the firefighters while in warm zones. The CFD has 
implemented its own variation; known as police assist companies (PACs), designated 
ladder trucks and personnel respond at the request of the SWAT commander to provide 
firefighting and subject matter expertise. Another rare example of tactical firefighter 
teams comes from the FDNY where arriving firefighters can be escorted by law 
enforcement into police warm zones to suppress structure fires during assaults.  
A. THE HOUSTON FIRE DEPARTMENT: HOUSTON, TEXAS 
In the fall of 2010, the Mayor of Houston conducted a nationwide search for a fire 
chief and hired a 30-year veteran from the West Coast. The fire chief conducted several 
informal, internal evaluations to identify response gaps within its service delivery 
model.80 It became apparent that strengths of the HFD revolved around what are 
considered traditional fire department core services: extinguishment of fires, hazardous 
material response, and pre-hospital emergency care.81 Opportunities for improvement 
involved strengthening the working relationship with the local police department since 
80 Houston Fire Department, “A Message from the Chief,” July 11, 2011; Houston Fire Department, 
“A Message from the Chief,” August 31, 2011.  
81 Houston Fire Department, “A Message from the Chief,” September 18, 2012. 
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departmental policies related to tactical, operational, and strategic support of law 
enforcement were outdated or non-existent.82 Although the HFD had instituted a 
homeland security office in the years following the 9/11 attacks, policy changes and new 
program implementation had stagnated since 2008.83  
While researching for more progressive policies involving joint police and fire 
task forces, the HFD identified three fire departments using variations of tactical 
firefighter teams able to support law enforcement during hostile events: the Loveland Fire 
Rescue Authority, the Charlotte Fire Department, and the FDNY. However, evaluations 
regarding the effectiveness of the tactical firefighter units did not appear to have been 
conducted. Furthermore, the three models did not enter into the hot zone nor offered 
equipment modifications to protect the teams from the range of hazards they could 
encounter. As a result, the HFD conducted a series of three field tests to evaluate 
equipment needs for a tactical fire team to make hot zone entry. 
B. LOVELAND FIRE RESCUE AUTHORITY: LOVELAND, COLORADO 
Loveland, Colorado, is located about 46 miles north of Denver. The City 
of Loveland and the surrounding rural community encompass 190 square miles; the 
City of Loveland itself measures 25 square miles. The region is protected by the 
Loveland Fire Rescue Authority (LFRA), which provides rescue, firefighting, and first 
responder EMS services (no hospital transport). Thompson Valley EMS is a 
separate agency that provides the region with paramedic and emergency transport 
services. Thompson Valley EMS also provides the SWAT team with tactical 
emergency medical support (TEMS) through tactical paramedics. The Loveland SWAT 
team is a level 3 team consisting of 28 police officers who have SWAT capabilities in 
addition to their regular patrol duties.84  
82 HFD lacked written standard operating procedures for a tactical medical program it had 
implemented. Houston Fire Department, Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2009–2013 (Houston, TX: Houston 
Fire Department, n.d.). 
83 Houston Fire Department, Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2009–2013; Houston Fire Department. 
Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2011–2015 (Houston, TX: Houston Fire Department, n.d.). 
84 Email correspondence between Loveland Fire Rescue and Houston Fire Department, August 12, 
2015. 
 27 
In 2007, following a series of tactically complex emergencies involving 
clandestine drug labs, the LFRA created a special operations team composed of tactically 
trained, on-duty firefighters to assist the local SWAT team.85 Known as Tac Fire, the 
team consists of seven team members and a battalion chief.86 The Tac Fire program is 
modeled after nationally recognized tactical medical programs that have been in use 
around the country for over a decade. However, instead of providing medical support, 
Tac Fire provides fire suppression, forcible entry, technical rope applications, hazardous 
material operations, and first responders during warrant service and no-notice call-outs.87 
Rather than train SWAT officers to perform duties traditionally reserved for firefighters 
(breaching, fire suppression), Loveland has trained firefighters to work within the law 
enforcement environment at the direction of SWAT commanders.88 Although Tac Fire 
members are trained to render weapons safe, they are not certified law enforcement 
officers and are not armed; SWAT members provide force protection to these firefighters 
while in the warm zone.  
In 2015, Tac Fire responded to 21 call-outs with the SWAT team; however, after 
action reports to assess the effectiveness of the team have not been published.89 Like the 
SWAT team, Tac Fire is not a freestanding unit in Loveland; members respond to routine 
calls throughout their shift. Tac Fire members undergo additional training to qualify them 
for a position on the SWAT team. Members are required to complete basic SWAT school 
successfully and to maintain competence in LFRA rope and technical rescue operations. 
Tac Fire members must also complete Loveland SWAT’s bi-annual physical agility 
requirements to maintain their position on the team. In addition, Tac Fire members attend 
10 hours of monthly scenario-based training with the SWAT team. 
                                                 
85 Loveland Fire Rescue Authority, General Operations Policy: Tactical Fire Team Operational 
Policy, 1. 
86 Loveland Fire Rescue Authority, Proposal for Tactical Fire Team (Loveland, CO: Loveland Fire 
Rescue Authority, 2015), unpublished.  
87 Ibid. 
88 Loveland Fire Rescue Authority, General Operations Policy: Tactical Fire Team Operational 
Policy. 
89 “2015 Annual Report,” 24, accessed July 17, 2016, http://www.cityofloveland.org/modules/show 
document.aspx?documentid=29594.  
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The goal of Tac Fire was to serve as a force multiplier for the SWAT team by 
serving the tactical support functions of carrying equipment, conducting air monitoring, 
dragging victims, forcing entry and breaching, and communicating with the incident 
commander.90 Cost savings were also desired by avoiding redundant purchases for 
equipment. Tac Fire maintains and supplies the self-contained breathing apparatus 
(SCBAs) used by the SWAT team. In addition to subject matter expertise, Tac Fire 
provides the mechanical tools needed to force entry into structures (bolt cutters, saws, 
hydraulic tools, prying tools, etc.)—equipment that LFRA already had—while SWAT 
members stay on their weapons.91 Tac Fire members wear the same level of ballistic 
protection as SWAT; however, they do not combine the donning of ballistic equipment 
and firefighting protective equipment. 
C. CHARLOTTE FIRE DEPARTMENT: CHARLOTTE, NORTH 
CAROLINA 
With over 800,000 residents, and encompassing an area of almost 300 square 
miles, Charlotte is the largest and most populous city in North Carolina.92 Charlotte has a 
large risk profile. It is the second largest financial center in the United States and the only 
city in the world with two nuclear power stations and four reactors in close proximity to 
the downtown core.93  
Emergency response services are provided by several government agencies. 
Emergency medical services are provided by Mecklenburg County through an agency 
called MEDIC, which provides emergency medical transport to area hospitals and 
employs approximately 350 paramedics, EMTs, and emergency physicians.94 The CFD 
employs about 1,100 firefighters and EMTs. In addition to providing the city’s fire and 
rescue services, it also provides first responder medical care in the pre-hospital setting; 
90 Loveland Fire Rescue Authority, Proposal for Tactical Fire Team. 
91 Ibid. 
92 “United States Census Bureau,” accessed July 13, 2016. http://www.census.gov/. 
93 “Advanced Local Response Team,” accessed July 17, 2016, https://www.medic911.com/operations/ 
special-operations/advanced-local-response-team-alert.  
94 “FY15 Financial Report,” accessed July 14, 2016, https://www.medic911.com/assets/user/upload/ 
files/2015%20Annual%20Report%20sm(5).pdf.  
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however, the CFD does not provide medical transport to the hospital. The Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD) is a combined city and county police force 
with 1,850 officers protecting an area of 438 square miles. In addition to responding to 
planned and no-notice SWAT callouts, the CMPD SWAT team has patrol and 
investigative duties.  
The CMPD and MEDIC have developed a strong partnership over the years and 
have implemented two inter-agency teams. MEDIC has a special operations division 
specifically trained to assist the police when responding to hostile events, special events, 
and major disasters. This civil emergency unit (CEU) consists of 11 paramedics trained to 
mitigate civil disturbances and assigned to deploy with the CMPD CEU team during 
times of unrest.95 Eight paramedics support the CMPD SWAT team and deploy to 
SWAT responses.96 SWAT medics are required to complete basic SWAT school 
successfully and to attend the Counter Narcotics Tactical Operations Medical Support 
(CONTOMS) program provided by the U.S. Department of Defense. In addition, SWAT 
medics must complete 24 hours of monthly training with the SWAT team.  
Following the 2012 Democratic National Convention, the CFD and the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Police Department recognized the necessity of developing joint strategies to 
address emergencies in which fire is used as a weapon.97 Consequently, they have 
partnered and have designated two ladder companies as PACs. PAC members receive 
additional training related to tactical police operations and respond to most emergency 
SWAT deployments (barricaded subjects, hostage events, high-risk warrant service) on a 
standby basis.98 Among the PAC’s primary duties are suppressing fires during hostile 
events, rescuing injured officers, providing decontamination and supplementing tactical 
medic personnel during civil unrest, and assisting SWAT with forcible entry and with the 
                                                 
95 “Civil Emergency Unit,” accessed July 17, 2016, https://www.medic911.com/operations/special-
operations/civil-emergency-unit-ceu.  
96 “Special Weapons and Tactics,” accessed July 17, 2016, https://www.medic911.com/operations/ 
special-operations/special-weapons-tactics-swat. 
97 Charlotte Fire Department, Police Assist Company (PAC) Program Proposal (Charlotte, NC: 
Charlotte Fire Department, 2012), unpublished. 
98 Ibid. 
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management of building HVAC systems. PAC personnel also assist SWAT by 
functioning as subject matter experts and providing information related to the 
construction and layout of buildings, inspection records, and building schematics. In 
addition, PAC firefighters and EMTs are specifically trained in tactical emergency 
casualty care (TECC) and function as a force multiplier for the tactical medics. By 
providing a cadre of trained and regular personnel to assist and support police operations, 
PAC members become familiar with specific police tactics and needs during complicated 
hostile incidents.99  
D. FIRE DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 
With a population of more than 8.5 million residents, New York is the largest city 
in the United States. It encompasses an area of 469 square miles of which 305 square 
miles are land and the rest is water area. The New York Police Department (NYPD) 
employs over 35,000 officers, making it the largest U.S. civilian police force.100 In 
addition to being the site of the deadliest terrorist attack on American soil (September 11, 
2001), New York City is also the American city most often targeted by terrorists; it has 
had numerous foiled plots, giving it one of the highest threat profiles in the country.101  
The City of New York has developed the most robust counter-terrorism response 
capability in the country and is able to respond to active assaults within minutes.102 In 
2015, the NYPD created a full-time counterterrorism unit known as the Critical Response 
Command (CRC).103 The unit has 525 elite officers trained and armed to respond to the 
99 Charlotte Fire Department, Police Assist Company (PAC) Program Proposal. 
100 “Frequently Asked Questions|Police Administration,” accessed August 10, 2016, http://www.nyc. 
gov/html/nypd/html/faq/faq_police.shtml#1.  
101 House Committee on Homeland Security, “Beyond Bin Laden’s Caves and Couriers to a New 
Generation of Terrorists: Confronting the Challenges in a Post 9/11 World, Hearing before the U.S. House 
of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, 114th Cong., 1 (2015), https://www.hsdl.org/?view& 
did=791553. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Michael Wilson, “How an Elite New York Police Unit Rehearses for a Terrorist Attack,” New York 
Times, July 31, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/01/nyregion/new-york-police-prepare-terrorist-
attack.html?_r=0. 
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most violent terrorist attacks.104 When they are not training, the unit patrols the city and 
is further augmented by the Strategic Response Group (SRG); another newly created 
team of 700 patrol officers armed with high-powered rifles and trained to respond to 
active shooter events.105 In addition to these two counter terrorism units, the NYPD also 
has the emergency service unit (ESU). ESU members have the combined skills sets 
traditionally seen in SWAT, hazardous materials (HazMat), and search and rescue 
teams.106  
The NYPD ESU has over 500 full-time police officers assigned to its various 
teams and responds 24/7/365 to the most complicated incidents within the city.107 
Personnel are trained in 22 different disciplines to include urban search and rescue 
(USAR), use of heavy firearms and weapons, HazMat response, high angle and water 
rescue, and hostage negotiation.108 All ESU officers are certified emergency medical 
technicians (EMTs). In addition, the NYPD Tactical Medic Program is staffed with law 
enforcement ESU personnel who are certified paramedics, but are only allowed to 
administer advanced life support within the tactical environment. Annually, the ESU 
responds to over 150,000 callouts ranging from warrant service to rescues at train 
derailments.109  
The FDNY provides firefighting, rescue, and EMS services to the city. In 
addition, the FDNY has created several special operations units that assist during terrorist 
attacks and mass casualty events. As the largest American fire department, the FDNY 
employs over 11,000 firefighters and over 2,800 EMTs and paramedics. The FDNY 
                                                 
104 Wilson, “How an Elite New York Police Unit Rehearses for a Terrorist Attack,”  
105 J. David Goodman, “With Permanent Squad, New York Police Step Up Fight on Terrorism,” New 
York Times, November 20, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/21/nyregion/new-york-police-form-
counterterrorism-force-with-more-firepower-and-training.html?action=click&contentCollection=N.Y.% 
20%2F%20Region&module=RelatedCoverage&region=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article. 
106  “Press Release|50 New Members in NYPD Emerency Service Unit,” December 14, 2012, http:// 
www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/pr/pr_2012_12_04_esu_graduation_2012_12_04.shtml.  
107 “The Five T’s: Taking Effect,” accessed August 11, 2016, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/down 
loads/pdf/home_features/2016-05-23_nypd-five-t-s.pdf.  
108 Jennifer Hsu, “Inside the NYPD’s Elite Emergency Service Unit,” Police Department City of New 
York, January 9, 2012, http://www.wnyc.org/story/178955-blog-nypds-emergency-service-unit/.  
109 “The Five T’s: Taking Effect.”  
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Bureau of Emergency Medical Services (EMS) provides the city’s prehospital emergency 
medical care, staffing basic ambulances with EMTs, and advanced life support 
ambulances with paramedics. The EMS Bureau also has a special operations hazardous 
materials tactical (Haz-Tac) battalion that provides Haz-Tac units (Haz-Tac ambulances) 
and rescue medics.110  
Following the 2008 Mumbai attack, the NYPD and FDNY jointly studied the 
tactics and strategies of the terrorists and responders. Based on the lessons learned, the 
FDNY and NYPD created new interagency and interdisciplinary strategies toward their 
homeland security efforts.111 They implemented a program similar to Arlington’s rescue 
task force program. The FDNY’s integrated tactical response teams (ITRTs) are 
composed of line police officers, firefighters, and EMS personnel.112 Unlike Loveland, 
FDNY firefighters do not receive ballistic vests or specialized training related to police 
tactics or team movement. The ITRTs fall under the direction of the incident commander 
(law enforcement) and are escorted by the NYPD into the warm zone as needed. In 
addition to assisting with EMS functions and victim evacuation, the FDNY supports 
police tactical operations by serving as subject matter experts in building information, 
such as building layout, heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, 
standpipe and sprinklers, and the fire service recall of elevators.113  
Firefighters also assist with the restoration of damaged fire protection systems and 
the creation of water supplies to control fire spread. The restoration of fire suppression 
and fire protection systems is vital to controlling fire spread in large high rises with 
numerous occupants, and can include the physical repair by firefighters of compromised 
systems.114 By using positive ventilation and their knowledge of HVAC systems, 
110 Haz-Tac ambulances are staffed with personnel who can provide medical services within a HazMat 
environment. Rescue medics are ambulances staffed with paramedics who are also HazMat technicians and 
are trained in high angle rescue and trench rescue and other urban search and rescue techniques. 
111 Fire Department of the City of New York, Interagency Tactical Response Model: Integrating Fire 
and EMS with Law Enforcement to Mitigate Mumbai-Style Terrorist Attacks, 5. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Fire Department of the City of New York, Interagency Response Protocol to Active Shooter 
Incidents (New York: Fire Department of the City of New York, 2014), 5. 
114 Ibid. 
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firefighters, and available building and maintenance personnel can assist law enforcement 
by moving smoke away from areas of refuge for trapped victims and hostages. Fire 
suppression teams can also be integrated with SWAT members to extinguish fires, set up 
master streams, and force entry.115 The FDNY is also able to provide supplemental 
equipment, such as SCBAs or thermal imaging cameras.  
Information regarding the number of annual callouts for ITRTs is not available; 
however; the FDNY periodically assesses its capability and capacity to respond to mass 
casualty incidents and terrorist attacks through workshops, tabletop exercises, and full-
scale exercises, averaging between 35–40 preparedness exercises per year.116 Although 
New York has not faced a successful incendiary attack by terrorists since 9/11, the 
department continues actively to address the need to respond aggressively to such an 
event and has concluded that additional firefighting resources and training need to be 
devoted to mitigate the use of fire as a weapon. On September 8, 2015, Daniel Nigro, 
Commissioner of the New York City Fire Department, provided Congressional testimony 
before the House Committee on Homeland Security.117 During his statement, he briefly 
described the partnership between the FDNY, NYPD, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), and the Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Services, “to develop the 
procedures for joint tactical teams—teams comprised of fire personnel and security 
forces operating together—in an environment with armed terrorists, fire and smoke, and 
mass casualties.”118 
E. LESSONS LEARNED FROM EARLY MODELS  
Public safety practitioners are actively seeking to develop strategies to address 
hostile events incorporating the use of fire as an attack method.119 The tactical firefighter 
                                                 
115 Fire Department of the City of New York, Interagency Tactical Response Model: Integrating Fire 
and EMS with Law Enforcement to Mitigate Mumbai-Style Terrorist Attacks, 7. 
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teams discussed have attempted to fill operational gaps during complex hostile incidents 
when a multiple disciplinary approach is required to save lives. Each model was 
developed independently by the local departments and is tailored to the risk profile of 
each local jurisdiction. The Loveland Tac Fire team and the Charlotte PACs were 
specifically created to support law enforcement by embedding fire personnel within the 
SWAT teams. The members of those teams are vetted for specific skill sets and are 
required to maintain a pre-defined level of physical fitness to qualify. Successfully 
completing annual physical agility and SWAT scenario-based testing are requirements of 
staying on the team. In addition, the members of Loveland Tac Fire and Charlotte PAC 
are required to participate in monthly training with the SWAT team. Tactical movement 
and team integration are reinforced by having the same cadre of firefighters and police 
officers working and training together. Of the three teams, Loveland is the only one that 
provides firefighters with ballistic vests and headgear, although all three teams work 
within the warm zone when escorted by police. 
The FDNY model uses responding line personnel to form firefighting and police 
rescue task forces during hostile events. Unlike the other two models in which a cadre of 
select firefighters train with specific law enforcement personnel, New York’s model does 
not provide additional tactical police training or awareness to its firefighters. 
Furthermore, police officers and firefighters often do not know each other since they do 
not drill or exercise together on a regular basis. However, in creating the RTF firefighting 
model, the FDNY has ensured that any of New York City’s 11,000 firefighters can 
respond with any of the 35,000 law enforcement officers within the city’s 469 square 
miles, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. New York’s model provides for abundantly 
available public safety rescue task force teams who can arrive at an incident within 
minutes and can respond to multiple simultaneous attacks without depleting its 
workforce. The New York model does not prioritize the pre-establishment of 
relationships through integrated training and familiarization with the other’s operating 
procedures, equipment, and tactics. In contrast, Loveland Tac Fire and Charlotte PAC 
have a limited number of available tactical firefighters to respond with SWAT team 
members. Loveland Tac Fire members are assigned to a single fire station within its 190 
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square mile area of response while the Charlotte PAC has team members assigned to two 
fire stations across 300 square miles. However, as indicated by Fire Commissioner Daniel 
Nigro, New York is in the process of creating additional procedures for joint tactical 
teams that would combine firefighters with local and federal law enforcement personnel 
to “enter an environment in which armed terrorists, fire, and mass casualties are present;” 
which appears similar to the model proposed by Theodore Moody.120 
The jurisdictions discussed developed their tactical firefighter teams to respond to 
high consequence, low frequency events. Although variations to the deployment of the 
different models exists, all three jurisdictions established strategies to assist law 
enforcement by enabling police officers to focus on their primary mission of neutralizing 
assailants and securing the perimeter without having to engage in support activities 
traditionally conducted by firefighters. In addition to maximizing personnel resources, the 
establishment of tactical firefighter teams appears to suggest cost savings to local 
jurisdictions by making firefighting tools, such as breaching equipment, thermal imaging 
cameras, and SCBAs readily available to law enforcement. However, a limitation shared 
by all three teams is the inability to progress beyond the warm zone into high hazard 
areas, particularly in situations in which fire and smoke are present. 
F. REMAINING GAPS 
Hostile environments increasingly require a cross-disciplinary incident response 
by first responders; however, numerous instances of dynamic threat environments happen 
in which first responders were unable to enter the hot zone because they lacked an 
appropriate protective gear ensemble. A recent example occurred in June 2016 in 
Fremont, California during a SWAT standoff in which a barricaded suspect held a 
hostage at a residential house fire. Although firefighters were on scene and attempted to 
extinguish the fire from the outside while SWAT provided force protection, the team was 
                                                 
120 House Committee on Homeland Security, “Beyond Bin Laden’s Caves and Couriers to a New 
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unable to enter the structure because the barricaded suspect was still inside.121 The fire 
department could not risk entry for fear of being shot, and law enforcement personnel 
lacked turnout gear and the firefighting training/tactics to enter an incendiary 
environment.  
Beginning in 2003, the Department of Homeland Security initiated a series of 
studies to evaluate the capability needs of first responders during catastrophic 
incidents.122 The studies identified “the stove piped approach to PPE development” that 
continues to limit protective equipment for use within specific disciplines despite the 
emergence of multiple hazards during catastrophic events.123 Responders are increasingly 
deploying to events that pose a greater range of hazards not traditional to their discipline, 
and find themselves lacking the necessary protective equipment to enter the hot zone 
successfully.124 The studies concluded that first responders of the future will require a 
modular protective gear ensemble that allows them to mix and match protective 
equipment commensurate with the hazards they face at an incident.125 However, in the 
absence of a commercially available modular protective ensemble, first responders find it 
necessary to protect themselves through currently available resources.  
In a white paper assessing the effectiveness of the public safety response to the 
November 2015 Paris attacks, the authors noted that the effective management of a 
terrorist incident will require “appropriate equipment and training to neutralize or at least 
contain the terrorists.”126 National guidance from FEMA and the InterAgency Board 
(IAB), and jurisdiction-specific protocols recognize the need to create interagency 
121 “Tear Gas Sparks Fire That Kills Suspect in Shooting of 2 Fremont Officers,” June 2, 2016, 
http://abc7news.com/news/tear-gas-sparks-fire-that-kills-suspect-in-shooting-of-2-fremont-officers/
1367974/.  
122 Department of Homeland Security, Project Responder 4: 2014 National Technology Plan for 
Emergency Responders to Catastrophic Incidents (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security 
Science and Technology Directorate, 2014), 1. 
123 Ibid., 89. 
124 Ibid., 92. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Homeland Security Advisory Council, The Attacks on Paris: Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: 
Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2016), 26, http://hsacouncil.org/Documents/20160607_Paris_ 
WhitePaper_Master%20FINAL.pdf. 
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communication plans and tactically integrated response plans for multijurisdictional 
teams.127 However, integration of policy and tactical action plans must be supported with 
the ability to integrate protective equipment ensembles for a mixed threat environment. 
What is missing from the literature is a systematic analysis of the specific equipment a 
cross-disciplined team needs and can realistically deploy in a dynamic threat 
environment. For example, the IAB recommends that police and fire train together before 
using specialized equipment, such as SCBAs during an emergency incident, and suggests 
the use of ballistic cylinder covers to protect SCBAs from projectiles; however, ballistic 
resistant cylinder covers are not a protective item currently readily available outside of 
the military environment.128 In the absence of the appropriate specialized equipment to 
enter austere environments, responders will have limited entry to the hot zone, potentially 
posing tactical disadvantages.  
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IV. PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT NEEDS FOR TACTICAL 
FIREFIGHTER ENTRY TEAMS 
The previous chapter described the limitation of early tactical fire team models in 
their ability to progress into hot zones in which ballistic and incendiary weapons are 
simultaneously present. This chapter discusses the technology and equipment needs that a 
group of cross-trained first first responders needs to enter an austere multiple threat 
environment to extinguish the fire, free hostages, and neutralize assailants. During its 
research, the HFD identified equipment used across public safety disciplines that could 
be used in non-traditional combinations to provide protection to a tactical firefighter entry 
team.129 It then designed various procedures to evaluate the feasibility of introducing the 
equipment to conditions that simulated a fire environment with the discharging of 
firearms. While extremely rugged, firefighting protective equipment was never designed 
to withstand the impact of gunfire and provides no protection against projectiles. In light 
of this, the HFD elected to specifically evaluate SCBAs, gloves, and ballistic vests in 
combination with firefighting personal protective equipment (PPE).130  
As was noted by the IAB, fire can also be used as a weapon during ambushes of 
first responders, barricaded suspect situations (with or without hostages), during civil 
unrest since arson and firebombing are common tactics, and through arson in forested 
areas either near urban communities or in rural locales.131 Therefore, an initial entry team 
needs to be equipped appropriately to navigate what could potentially be a hot, smoke-
filled, low-visibility environment typically encountered during fires; in addition, threats 
could also include those traditionally mitigated by law enforcement personnel, such as 
gunfire and IEDs. During its research, the HFD concluded that using a combination of 
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traditional firefighting gear and tools, ballistic protection worn by police officers, and 
gloves that provide thermal protection and dexterity for firearms manipulation, will allow 
first responders to enter the hot zone effectively during a multi-threat environment 
involving ballistic and incendiary threats.132 The HFD’s analysis builds on the traditional 
firefighting PPE ensemble by suggesting modifications to the gloves and incorporating 
ballistic protection and helmet-mounted thermal imaging camera technologies in the 
context of a tactical firefighter entry team. 
A. PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 
Traditional structural firefighting PPE consists of an ensemble: turnout gear, 
helmet, boots, hood, SCBA, facepiece, and gloves.133 This protective equipment is 
governed by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), which designates 
minimum protective requirements for PPE within incendiary environments.134 One of the 
most important minimum protective requirements is addressed by NFPA 1971, which 
includes thermal protection standards. Turnout gear and gloves must have a minimum 
thermal protection performance (TPP) rating of 35.135 The TPP test, developed by 
DuPont in the 1970s, “measures the amount of time before temperature and energy 
transferred to the fabric reach a level that would cause a second-degree burn to the wearer 
of the PPE.”136 A TPP of 35 means the garments must protect the wearer from sustaining 
second-degree burns for at least 17.5 seconds in flashover conditions.137  
132 Houston Fire Department, internal memo, January 4, 2016. 
133 David W. Dodson, Firefighter’s Handbook: Firefighting and Emergency Response, 2nd ed. 
(Clifton Park, NY: Delmar Learning Executive Wood, 2004), 127.  
134 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1971: Standard on Protective Ensembles for 
Structural Fire Fighting and Proximity Fire Fighting, 2013 ed. (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protections 
Association, 2013), http://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/free-access. 
135 Ibid. 
136 “Thermal Protection Performance Test,” accessed September 10, 2015, http://www.dupont.co.uk/ 
products-and-services/personal-protective-equipment/thermal-protective-apparel-accessories/articles/du 
pont-thermal-protection-performance-test.html.  
137 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1971: Standard on Protective Ensembles for 
Structural Fire Fighting and Proximity Fire Fighting. 
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1. Structural Firefighter Turnout Gear 
Firefighter protective clothing is designed with the primary purpose of limiting 
heat transfer to the wearer to provide the interior structural firefighter with time to 
extinguish the fire.138 Turnout or bunker gear consists of a coat and pants constructed 
with three layers.139 The outer shell is typically constructed from Nomex or Kevlar, 
strong, lightweight fabrics that withstand punctures and abrasions in addition to being 
fire-resistive.140 A vapor barrier follows and provides protection from chemicals and 
steam burns; the inner layer provides protection from thermal injury.141 While turnout 
gear protects the wearer from thermal injury and chemicals, it provides no protection 
against gunfire or IEDs. Therefore, in an environment in which gunfire and thermal 
hazards are present, ballistic protection will need to be incorporated into the protective 
ensemble. However, the additional weight of a ballistic vest and the added thermal 
burden could potentially render the combination unfeasible within a heated environment. 
2. Helmets, Boots, and Hoods 
Helmets, boots, and hoods are integral parts to the firefighting protective 
equipment ensemble but were not field tested by the HFD due to a belief that these 
articles would not need modification.142 Firefighting helmets provide protection against 
impact from falling, burning objects and against heat; however, they lack ballistic 
protection.143 In high threat environments, law enforcement personnel may elect to wear 
ballistic helmets constructed of Kevlar capable of stopping rifle rounds, but ballistic 
helmets have not been tested and approved for a fire environment. Additional testing and 
research will be needed to determine whether the ballistic helmet is fire resistive or can 
                                                 
138 Dodson, Firefighter’s Handbook: Firefighting and Emergency Response, 127.  
139 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1971: Standard on Protective Ensembles for 
Structural Fire Fighting and Proximity Fire Fighting. 
140 “Thermal Protection Performance Test.” 
141 Ibid. 
142 Houston Fire Department, internal memo, August 3, 2015. 
143 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1971: Standard on Protective Ensembles for 
Structural Fire Fighting and Proximity Fire Fighting. 
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be modified for a fire environment. Helmets were not tested by the HFD and should be an 
area of inquiry for future research.  
Boots are typically constructed of leather or rubber and are designed to protect 
against chemicals, heat, and sharp objects.144 Structural firefighting boots are notoriously 
heavy and could potentially contribute to fatigue during extended operations. The HFD 
did not field test nor offer recommendations for boots. Protective hoods protect the head 
and neck by encapsulating them with a flexible knit hoods or a more rigid Reed hood; 
both are designed to provide thermal protection.145 The knit hood is constructed of a 
single layer of Nomex, while the Reed hood is a multi-layer garment with a Kevlar 
exterior that also offers a vapor barrier interior layer.146 The HFD did not field test 
different types of hoods; however, several of the field notes indicated that the use of a 
Reed hood made scanning a room and using immediate action rapid deployment (IARD) 
techniques difficult because of the inability to rotate the neck.147  
3. Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus and Facepiece
Firefighters wear facepieces or masks in conjunction with SCBAs for respiratory 
protection from heat, smoke, hot toxic gases, and oxygen-deficient environments.148 This 
piece of equipment allows the wearer to work in areas that would normally be untenable 
and immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH).149 The facepiece is constructed of 
a heat resistant polycarbonate. Before 2013, the facepiece was only required to withstand 
a five-minute oven test at 200°F, followed by exposure to 10 seconds of direct flame 
impingement.150 In a 2011 study conducted by National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), “the cutoff point in lens exterior temperature for thermal degradation 
144 Dodson, Firefighter’s Handbook: Firefighting and Emergency Response, 129. 
145 Ibid.  
146 Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, October 9, 2015. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Dodson, Firefighter’s Handbook: Firefighting and Emergency Response, 143. 
149 Ibid.  
150 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1981: Standard on Open-Circuit Self-Contained 
Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) for Emergency Services, 2013 ed. (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protections 
Association, 2013), 37.  
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of the facepiece was found to be between 200°C (392°F) and 250°C (482°F), which is 
consistent with the lower end of the polycarbonate melting temperature range.”151 
However, in 2013, the NFPA standard was upgraded and new facepieces are now 
manufactured to maintain integrity at 500°F for five minutes in the oven test.152  
The SCBA consists of a compressed air bottle and a harness with valves, gauges, 
hoses, and regulators.153 The compressed air bottle or cylinder can be constructed of 
aluminum, steel, or a carbon fiber composite; composite cylinders are lighter weight and 
composed of an aluminum alloy inner shell with a carbon-wrapped exterior.154  
In addition to the SCBAs designed for firefighters, several manufacturers produce 
stealth model SCBAs for law enforcement and military use. These SCBAs are designed 
to maintain concealment and are shrouded in black covers. Furthermore, all audible 
alarms and lights have been removed to facilitate concealment. However, neither the law 
enforcement and military model nor the firefighting model addresses the need to protect 
the compressed air cylinder from ballistics. This area will require future research. The 
HFD considered the SCBA an integral component for entry into a smoke-filled 
environment; protection of the respiratory tract and the inability to maintain an air supply 
within areas untenable in the absence of SCBAs were deemed mission critical, and 
therefore, the HFD elected to test the effects of ballistic impact to the air cylinder.155 
4. Gloves 
Like turnout gear, structural firefighting gloves are designed to provide thermal 
and abrasion protection.156 They are constructed with three layers: an exterior abrasion 
                                                 
151 Amy Mensch, George Braga, and Nelson Bryner, NIST Technical Note 1724: Fire Exposures of 
Fire Fighter Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Facepiece Lenses (Gaithersburg, MD: Fire Research 
Division Engineering Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011), 29. 
152 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1981: Standard on Open-Circuit Self-Contained 
Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) for Emergency Services, 37.  
153 Dodson, Firefighter’s Handbook: Firefighting and Emergency Response, 152.  
154 Scott Safety, Cylinders, For Use with Scott Safety Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (Monroe, 
NC: Scott Safety, 2012), https://www.scottsafety.com/en/us/DocumentandMedia1/Bro_Cylinders_HS_ 
7012_0312.pdf.  
155 Houston Fire Department, internal memo, August 3, 2015. 
156 Dodson, Firefighter’s Handbook: Firefighting and Emergency Response, 129.  
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barrier (usually leather), a vapor barrier, and an internal thermal barrier.157 Structural 
firefighter gloves are designed to withstand the rigors of interior structural firefighting 
repeatedly by providing protection against sharp debris and heat. However, their bulk 
limits manual dexterity, which is sacrificed in lieu of protection.158 While this type of 
glove protects the firefighter, it is not suited for law enforcement personnel who require 
manual dexterity to handle a firearm. 
Shooting gloves used by law enforcement officers are constructed of thin leather 
or synthetic materials that are not rated or treated for an incendiary environment; 
therefore, they will not protect the officers’ hands in a fire. The glove must be thin 
enough to allow unimpeded manipulation of the trigger yet provide sufficient thermal 
protection to shield the wearer from contact burns from a hot weapon and radiant heat.159 
Neither bulky structural firefighting gloves nor thin law enforcement shooting gloves are 
suited for the entry team.  
The HFD’s research indicated the possibility that the military held the solution to 
this issue. Like firefighting gloves, flight gloves worn by fighter pilots must also 
withstand heat during a flash fire.160 However, flight gloves must also be thin enough to 
allow the manual dexterity needed by the pilot. Some flight gloves are NFPA 1971 
compliant, and therefore, are rated to provide thermal resistance. The HFD considered 
hand protection and weapon manipulation a fundamental requirement for mission success 
and chose to conduct field tests on gloves.161 
5. Ballistic Protection
In addition to structural firefighter protective gear, the HFD incorporated 
technologies from other disciplines to protect responders from the dynamic threat 
environment. Their studies indicated that while not traditionally used in a fire 
157 Scott Safety, Cylinders, For Use with Scott Safety Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus. 
158 Dodson, Firefighter’s Handbook: Firefighting and Emergency Response, 129. 
159 Houston Fire Department, internal memo, January 4, 2016. 
160 “DOD Flight Glove Specifications,” MILDTL-81188C, accessed September 29, 2015, http://every 
spec.com/MIL-SPECS/MIL-SPECS-MIL-DTL/download.php?spec=MIL-DTL-81188C.041463.pdf.  
161 Houston Fire Department, internal memo, August 3, 2015. 
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environment, ballistic protection in the form of body armor could be worn under the 
firefighting protective ensemble.162 Body armor typically consists of front and rear 
panels, panel covers, and a carrier worn to provide ballistic protection to the torso.163 
Panels are designed to accommodate the shape of the wearer by coming in several shapes 
and sizes.164 No type of body armor stops every threat; selection of the type to be worn 
depends on the threat the officers will face.165 
Soft body armor is flexible, daily wear armor designed to stop handguns and can 
be worn over or concealed under clothing. Soft armor is constructed of multiple layers of 
ballistic resistant material that distribute the force of the projectile by catching and 
deforming the round.166 Hard armor offers greater protection from greater threats (rifle 
rounds) and is constructed of rigid material, such as ceramics, composites, metallic, or 
compressed laminate sheets.167 Hard armor absorbs and distributes the energy in the 
round by either capturing or deforming the bullet or by breaking it apart.168 An in-
conjunction body assembly can be created when hard plates are added to soft armor to 
increase the protection level.169 However, as weight is increased, the comfort and 
mobility of the wearer can decrease.  
Firefighter turnout gear lacks ballistic protection; therefore, in a threat 
environment with firearms present, ballistic vests are essential to a protective entry team 
ensemble. The HFD was unable to locate reports describing the ability to combine 
ballistic vests with turnout gear, and therefore, elected to test the feasibility of combining 
                                                 
162 Houston Fire Department, internal memo, January 4, 2016. 
163 National Institute of Justice, Guide to Body Armor, Application Guide 0101.06 to Ballistic-
Resistant Body Armor (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2014), 15.  
164 Ibid.  
165 Ibid., 21.  
166 Ibid., 15.  
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid., 7. 
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these protective articles.170 Of concern were the effects of the additional weight on the 
performance and stamina of the operator.171 
6. Thermal Imaging Cameras
During their field-testing, the HFD used handheld thermal imaging cameras since 
this piece of equipment is routinely used by Houston firefighters during response to low 
visibility environments. Thermal imaging cameras (TICs) were originally developed to 
provide soldiers with a tactical advantage by enabling them to see across dark, smoke-
filled battlefields.172 This technology has been adapted to withstand the fire ground 
environment—with its housing constructed from heat and water-resistant, ruggedized 
materials—and has become an indispensable technological advance in the fire service. 
TICs work by converting infrared radiation to visible light that shows a heat picture of 
the scene; however, two objects at the same temperature will show as the same shade.173 
TICs used by firefighters are typically handheld devices, and while they provide 
firefighters with improved situational awareness, they cannot see through objects but 
rather detect the temperature differences on the surface of objects.174 In addition, 
handheld TICs are cumbersome and occupy one of the operator’s available hands. 
Helmet-mounted TICs, while less common, have the advantage of freeing the 
firefighter’s hands to use other tools. Studies support several advantages of using helmet-
mounted TICs over handheld TICs, “Teams of firefighters with helmet-mounted cameras 
completed search tasks substantially faster, were less disoriented, and used less air than 
teams with a single handheld camera, which in turn fared better than teams with no TIC 
at all.”175 
170 Houston Fire Department, internal memo, August 3, 2015. 
171 Joo-Young Lee et al., “The Impact of Firefighter Personal Protective Equipment and Treadmill 
Protocol on Maximal Oxygen Uptake,” Journal of Occupational and Environmental Hygiene 10, no. 7 
(2013): 397. doi:10.1080/15459624.2013.792681.  
172 “How a TI Works,” accessed September 1, 2015, http://www.bullard.com/V3/products/thermal_ 
imaging/how_a_ti_works.php. 





Helmet-mounted TICs, however, do have limitations. In the monocle style TIC, 
depth perception is affected since they only provide a two-dimensional view, making it 
difficult to judge the distance of objects.176 Again, objects with the same surface 
temperature will show up as the same shade, making it difficult to distinguish between 
the two when they are side by side. Additional limitations include increased cost and the 
need to train regularly since the wearer’s eyes must adapt.177 Until recently, this 
technology was only available in the United States as a monocle, allowing only one eye 
to see through the TIC while the other eye did not have enhanced vision. However, the 
latest helmet mounted TIC provides a small display on one side of the visual field in 
which the wearer can glance at the in mask display.178 The limitations of this model 
result from the low quality of the image that makes it difficult to distinguish between 
objects.179 The HFD’s field tests did not assess the benefits and disadvantages of the 
various types of TICs; however, their field notes did reference the limitations to utilizing 
a handheld unit.180 
Houston’s findings concluded that at a minimum, the initial entry team will need a 
PPE ensemble composed of elements traditionally worn by various first responders, but 
have not historically been worn together; firefighter structural PPE combined with 
ballistic vests typically used by law enforcement to protect against gunfire, flight gloves, 
and SCBAs.181  
  
                                                 
176 Boyd, “Using Hands-Free Thermal Imaging Cameras,” 95–97. 
177 Ibid. 
178 “Scott Sight,” accessed May 19, 2016, https://www.scottsafety.com/en/us/Pages/ProductDetail. 
aspx?productdetail=Scott+Sight.  
179 Based on the author’s direct experimentation and observation. 
180 Houston Fire Department, internal memo, January 4, 2016. 
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V. HFD FIELD RESEARCH 
This chapter explains the field tests conducted by the HFD from 2015–2016.182 
Much of the information contained in this chapter was obtained from unpublished HFD 
field notes.183 During their research, the HFD concluded that using a combination of 
traditional firefighting gear and tools, ballistic protection worn by police officers, and 
gloves that provide thermal protection and dexterity for firearms manipulation, will allow 
first responders to enter the hot zone effectively during a multi-threat environment 
involving ballistic and incendiary threats.184 The HFD’s analysis builds on the traditional 
firefighting PPE ensemble by suggesting modifications to the gloves and incorporating 
ballistic protection and helmet-mounted thermal imaging camera technologies in the 
context of a tactical firefighter entry team. 
A. SELF-CONTAINED BREATHING APPARATUS 
This section describes the purpose, methods and results of HFD’s field testing of 
SCBAs. It evaluates their field testing and documents their decisions to design the field 
testing in the manner in which they did. Members of the HPD SWAT team and HPD 
bomb team collaborated with the HFD to document the effect of gunfire on SCBAs.185 
Specifically, the HFD was concerned with the possibility that the firefighters’ 
compressed air cylinders would rupture if struck by projectiles, thereby, injuring the 
wearer, and ultimately, affecting mission success during a hostile event.186 
                                                 
182 The information included in this chapter was obtained from direct experimentation that the author 
conducted. When applicable, reference is made to the unpublished documentation.  
183 Unpublished field notes and memos are public record and discoverable upon request from the 
Houston Fire Department through the Texas Public Information Act (TPIA).  
184 Houston Fire Department, internal memo, January 4, 2016. 
185 The information provided in this section was obtained from the Houston Fire Department from 
unpublished field notes, October 9, 2015. 
186 Houston Fire Department, internal memo, August 3, 2015. 
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1. Purpose
The purpose of this evaluation was to determine what would happen to a SCBA 
and the wearer if the compressed air tanks were struck. Scott SCBAs—the style worn by 
Houston firefighters—were tested to document the effects of various calibers of 
projectiles striking compressed air cylinders while worn by an operator. The SCBAs were 
subjected to different caliber rounds typically encountered by law enforcement in the 
Houston area. Personnel from the HPD SWAT team discharged the weapons while 
personnel from the HPD bomb team served as the safety officers and ensured that all 
attendees observed the testing from a safe location. Video surveillance equipment and 
photography were used to document the testing. 
2. Method
On October 9, 2015, at 1000 hours, a series of tests was conducted at the 
Harris County Bomb Squad Range located at 2316 Atascocita Rd. in Humble, Texas in 
an open air field. A 10’, wooden barricade with observation portals and dirt berms 
provided cover to observers posted. The tests were documented using a GoPro camera 
mounted on a stand five’ south of the target and a high-definition video camera was 
staged 15’ north of the target, allowing for high-definition, slow-motion video. 
Photographs were taken using a Nikon D5100 camera. The day was sunny but 
supplemental lighting in the form of flashlights and spotlights were used to 
illuminate the target for video quality enhancement. 
Two props were constructed in-house in preparation for testing, a heavy duty, 
steel stand and a mannequin constructed from a fire hose. The first step was to construct a 
stand to support the mannequin and SCBA during the testing. The stand needed to be 
rugged enough to withstand repeated exposure to gunfire and sturdy enough to hold the 
mannequin and SCBA assembly consisting of a composite 4,500 psi cylinder weighing 
19 pounds, and an aluminum Scott air pack harness weighing four pounds. A steel frame 
was welded together to provide the armature upon which the 190-pound mannequin and 
the SCBA with compressed air cylinder would be supported. The frame stood 5.5’ high.  
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The second prop was a hose mannequin constructed using 2.5” x 50’ 
decommissioned fire hoses, duct tape, steel weightlifting plates, and nuts and bolts. Every 
attempt was made to approximate the height and weight of an average American male. 
According to the latest CDC studies, an average American man weighs 195 pounds and 
stands 5’9” tall.187 In total, the mannequin measured 6’6” in height and weighed 191 
pounds. However, once placed on the stand, the mannequin settled under its own weight 
to stand 5’11.” A Scott SCBA with a full air bottle was fitted on the mannequin and 
secured with the retention strap. The cylinder valve assembly was left in place; the 
regulator, hoses, gauges, PASS device and facepiece were not used during the tests.188 
Following each test sequence (six in total), the old air cylinder was removed and a new 
cylinder was used for each different weapon. The cartridges most commonly encountered 
by Houston police officers were used during the testing, rifle rounds included .308 and 
.223 cartridges. Buckshot (00) and slugs were used with the shotgun. The pistol rounds 
used were .45 auto, .40 S&W, and 9 mm Lugers. 
3. Results 
This section describes and reports HFD’s results during the six field tests 
conducted using different calibers of ammunition. The weapons used were semi-
automatic pistols, shotguns, and rifles. In addition, the damage caused by the various 
calibers of ammunition was recorded and evaluated. 
a. Test 1: .223 Caliber Cartridges 
The mannequin and stand were placed in the designated position and Remington 
55 grain full metal jacket cartridges were used to shoot at a compressed air cylinder 
secured to the mannequin’s air pack. The composite air cylinder was a 4,500 psi, 60-
minute bottle, with a total air capacity of 2,464 liters.189 The aluminum air pack harness 
                                                 
187 “Body Measurement,” accessed July 1, 2016, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/body-measure 
ments.htm.  
188 The Houston Fire Department’s field notes indicated they were reluctant to leave the accessories in 
place out of concern that they would become lost or damaged during the field tests. Unpublished field 
notes, October 9, 2015. 
189 Scott Safety, Cylinders, For Use with Scott Safety Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus. 
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weighed four pounds and the full air cylinder weighed 19 pounds for a total weight of 23 
pounds; the cylinder gauge read 4,100 psi.  
A sniper was positioned 30 yards away from the mannequin and stand when he 
took the shot. When the projectile struck the cylinder, it created an entry point but not a 
point of exit. The projectile bounced inside the cylinder numerous times and damaged the 
interior of the air bottle. The slow motion video camera captured images of a small flame 
jetting out of the point of entry immediately following impact with the tank. Evidence of 
scorching to the cylinder was visible inside of the tank and at multiple points on the 
exterior of the tank. The .223 round did not propel the mannequin from the stand. The 
mannequin and stand did, however, fall forward as the air rushed out, and landed face 
down within 2’ of its original placement. It took 48 seconds for all the air to escape. 
b. Test 2: .308 Cartridges
A new air bottle was placed in the air pack frame and secured with the frame’s 
retention strap. The mannequin, SCBA, and stand were returned to their designated 
placement. Federal Premium Gold Medal .308 Winchester cartridges were used to shoot 
the new 60-minute SCBA cylinder.190 A SWAT sniper was positioned 60 yards from the 
target.191 Upon impact, the projectile penetrated the tank creating both entry and exit 
points. The round also went through the aluminum air pack frame and embedded itself 
approximately 1/2” deep within the hose. The mannequin was not propelled, but the force 
of the escaping compressed air was great enough to cause the cylinder to break the plastic 
retention strap buckle. The bottle freed itself from the air pack harness, and traveled 
upwards about 50’ and a total of 242’ before landing.  
c. Test 3: Shotgun Ammunition
Since the retention strap buckle was broken during the previous test, a ratchet tie-
down strap was used to hold the new 60-minute bottle in the air pack harness. A 4,500 psi 
190 Sierra Match King boat tail hollow point (BTHP) bullets, 168 grain. This information was obtained 
from Houston Fire Department field notes, October 9, 2015. 
191 Both the safety officers and the sniper agreed to double the distance from the shooter to the target 
as a precaution. Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, October 9, 2015. 
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bottle was placed in the harness and shot with a shotgun loaded with Federal 00 buckshot. 
The shooter was positioned 20’ away behind a ballistic shield and shot the tank five times 
but did not rupture or crack it. Air pressure readings were taken before and after the 
bottle was shot and none of the air escaped. The exterior of the tank displayed damage to 
the carbon fiber exterior where it was peppered by the projectiles. The bottle was left in 
place and was shot five times with a shotgun loaded with Remington 1-ounce slugs. On 
the fifth shot, the tank cracked and slowly released the compressed air during 248 
seconds. Throughout this test, the mannequin remained positioned on the stand and did 
not move. 
d. Test 4: .45 Auto Ammunition
A new 60-minute cylinder was placed in the air pack worn by the mannequin and 
was secured with the ratchet tie-down. This test used .45 auto Speer Lawman 230 grain 
full metal jacket ammunition.192 The shooter was positioned 20’ west of the target, 
behind a ballistic shield, and discharged five rounds at the cylinder. The projectiles struck 
the cylinder and traveled along the curvature of the tank before stopping and embedding 
themselves within the fibers. In the process, some of the carbon fiber peeled off the tank 
along the bullets’ trajectories; however, no loss of air was observed, nor any indication 
that the tank had ruptured.193 
e. Test 5: .40 S&W Ammunition
A new 60-minute cylinder was secured to the harness with the ratchet tie-down 
strap. This test used .40 S&W Speer Lawman 180 grain full metal jacket ammunition.194 
The cylinder contained 4,150 psi of air. The shooter was positioned 20’ west of the target, 
behind a ballistic shield, and discharged five rounds at the cylinder. The projectiles struck 
the cylinder and traveled along the curvature of the tank. All the projectiles were 
observed to have embedded themselves within the composite fibers. In the process, the 
192 Muzzle velocity of 830 feet/second and muzzle energy 352 foot pounds. Houston Fire Department, 
unpublished field notes, October 9, 2015. 
193 Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, October 9, 2015. 
194 Muzzle velocity of 985 feet/second and muzzle energy 388 foot pounds. Houston Fire Department, 
unpublished field notes. 
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carbon fiber peeled off the tank along the bullets’ paths; however, no loss of air pressure 
was observed. 
f. Test 6: 9 mm Luger
This test used 9 mm Luger Speer Lawman 124 grain full metal jacket 
ammunition.195 A new air cylinder with 4,100 psi of air was secured in the harness using 
the ratchet tie-down strap. The shooter was positioned 20’ west of the target, behind a 
ballistic shield, and discharged five rounds at the cylinder. The projectiles struck the 
cylinder and traveled along the curvature of the tank. In the process, the carbon fiber 
peeled off the tank along the bullets’ trajectories; no loss of air was observed. 
4. Evaluation
Pursuing an armed assailant is a dangerous and tactically complex situation 
compounded by the introduction of additional hazards, such as fire. While the use of 
firefighting PPE and SCBAs can protect a team from thermal injury, members of the 
entry team run the risk of having their air supply compromised if their tank becomes 
damaged from projectiles. The HFD’s principle concerns centered on the risk of 
explosion of a tank damaged by gunfire or of propulsion of the wearer while still 
harnessed to the air pack and cylinder.196 When forcefully struck or damaged by 
projectiles, none of the tanks exploded during the field tests; however, the two cylinders 
exposed to the largest caliber rounds sustained significant damage with a single shot 
leading to catastrophic failure within seconds.197 
a. .308 Cartridge
The .308 cartridge was the largest round used. Although none of the damaged 
cylinders propelled the mannequin through the air, the tank damaged by the .308 
ammunition released the compressed air with sufficient force that it broke the buckle 
195 Muzzle velocity of 1090 feet/second and muzzle energy 327 foot pounds. Houston Fire 
Department, unpublished field notes. 
196 Houston Fire Department, internal memo, August 3, 2015. 
197 Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, October 9, 2015. 
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used to secure the air cylinder to the air pack harness. The .308 caliber round penetrated 
through both sides of the compressed air cylinder and lodged itself into the mannequin 
causing the quick release of all the air; however, only the tank became airborne and 
traveled a distance of 242’ leaving the air pack frame and mannequin on the stand.198 
During the testing, the first two cylinders were secured to the harness with a 
retention strap and buckle, but were not coupled to the rubber pressure-reducer hose 
leading from the cylinder valve assembly to the regulator. It is unknown whether the 
force produced by depressurization would have been sufficient to dislodge the cylinder 
from the hose and coupling or whether the cylinder would have remained tethered via the 
hose despite the broken buckle. Regardless, the outcome would be catastrophic for the 
wearer. An out of control cylinder still tethered to the hose could repeatedly strike the 
wearer or anyone in close proximity. In addition, the rapid release of air will leave the 
wearer without an air supply in seconds. All the compressed air escaped within 48 
seconds. The .308 cartridge proved to be the most dangerous and would likely be lethal.  
b. .223 Cartridge 
While the .223 ammunition did not propel the tank, the depressurization caused 
the stand and mannequin with SCBA to fall facedown approximately 2’ from its original 
placement.199 The .223 ammunition penetrated only one side of the cylinder and caused a 
slower depressurization of the SCBA than the .308 ammunition. The Remington .223 
cartridge pierced the cylinder that created a point of entry but no exit. Although the air 
supply took longer to escape, the wearer would not have much time to exit the IDLH 
environment encountered during fires and locate breathable ambient air.200 An additional 
complication involved the heat transfer of the projectile to the tank and air supply. 
                                                 
198 Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, October 9, 2015. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) is defined by the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) as “an atmosphere that poses an immediate threat to life, would cause irreversible 
adverse health effects, or would impair an individual’s ability to escape from a dangerous atmosphere,” 
“Section 7—VII. Summary and Explanation,” January 8, 1998, https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owa 
disp.show_document?p_id=1053&p_table=PREAMBLES.  
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Scorching was clearly visible inside the cylinder.201 The heat transferred through to the 
exterior carbon fiber where more scorching and heat damage was visible. In addition to 
the short time frame in which all the air was lost, the air available during those 48 
seconds may have been heated and could cause thermal damage to the operator’s 
respiratory tract.  
c. Shotgun: 00 Buckshot and Slugs
It took five rounds of shotgun slugs to crack the SCBA tank causing a slow air 
release that lasted several minutes. The shotgun slugs cracked the tank but did not pierce 
the tank that allowed the compressed air to leak out slowly over the course of 2.5 
minutes.202 In an IDLH environment with a compromised ambient air supply, an 
extremely short amount of time to find breathable air will affect the ability of an entry 
team to complete its mission. The 00 Buckshot did not cause a catastrophic failure by 
compromising the integrity of the tank or adversely impacting the wearer’s air supply.  
d. Semi-automatic Pistol Cartridges
None of the handgun ammunition damaged the tank to the point of causing air to 
escape. None of the ammunition fired from the handguns penetrated or damaged the 
integrity of the air cylinder.203 However, gunfire from handguns could potentially 
ricochet from the tank and injure the entry team.  
B. GLOVES 
This section describes the purpose, methods, and results of HFD’s field testing of 
different types of gloves. It evaluates their field testing and documents their decisions to 
design the field testing in the manner in which they did. The gloves were evaluated for 
thermal resistance and dexterity. 
201 This observation was noted in the October 9, 2015 unpublished Houston Fire Department field 
notes and resulted from participation in direct experimentation by the author. 




The HFD evaluated two styles of gloves under live fire (incendiary) conditions to 
assess whether gloves could permit the wearer to manipulate and discharge a firearm 
while maintaining adequate thermal protection. Department-issued structural firefighting 
gloves and thermal resistant flight gloves used by pilots were tested. The flight gloves 
were specifically selected because of their fire resistance ratings.204 
2. Method 
Both styles of gloves underwent two field tests that took place at two different 
venues. The first field test assessed the thermal protection of the gloves during a timed 
evolution. This assessment occurred at the fire training facility and incorporated the use 
of an external heat source. The second field test assessed the ability of the operator to 
draw a holstered firearm while wearing gloves; although the firearms were not loaded, 
the evolution occurred at a law enforcement bomb and firing range. Each participant for 
these field tests held state commissions in firefighting and in law enforcement.  
The first field test happened on August 10, 2015 at the HFD’s training facility 
located at 8030 Braniff in Houston, Texas, within the department’s live fire training 
structure (“burn building”).205 Weather conditions were hot and sunny (temperature in 
shade: 98°F, temperature: 102°F, heat index: 104°F) with 95% humidity. The participants 
wore HFD-issued turnout gear and Scott SCBA packs (60-minute bottles containing 
4,100 psi air), and carried hand-held thermal imaging cameras able to take temperature 
readings. Three wooden pallets and hay were ignited using a natural gas feed in the 
designated first floor burn chamber to create hot, smoky conditions. Temperature 
readings were recorded throughout the exercise using TICs. Within five minutes of 
ignition in the burn chamber room, the floor temperature reading was recorded at 105°F 
                                                 
204 The flight gloves meet the following standards and regulations. “Orion Glove,” accessed October 
3, 2015, https://www.wileyx.com/pdf/SpecSheets/ORION_Glove.pdf. 
205 The information provided in this section was obtained from the Houston Fire Department, 
unpublished field notes, August 10, 2015. 
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and the ceiling temperature was 300°F.206 Fifteen minutes later, the floor temperature 
had increased to 150°F where it remained for the remainder of the 20-minute evolution; 
the ceiling temperature remained at 500°F.  
Participants donned full firefighting PPE with SCBAs (60-minute bottles at 4,100 
psi) and thermal imaging cameras. Participant #1 wore department issued leather 
structural firefighting gloves; participant #2 wore flight gloves. The participants remained 
within 3’ of one another throughout the exercise. While breathing tank air, both 
participants entered the building simultaneously and proceeded to the room containing 
the burn chamber. The participants exited the building and remained outside for 15 
minutes to allow the equipment to cool. The participants exchanged gloves and re-entered 
the burn building simultaneously for another 20-minute evolution.207  
The second field test was conducted on August 11, 2015, at the Harris County 
Bomb Squad Range located at 2316 Atascocita Rd in Humble, Texas.208 The purpose of 
this field test was to assess manual dexterity while wearing different glove styles to 
determine whether a holstered handgun could be drawn and fired. The two gloves tested 
were the structural firefighting gloves and flight gloves used during field test #1. The 
participants wore HFD issued structural firefighting gloves and drew holstered handguns 
(unloaded). Next, they located the trigger to fire the weapon. Finally, they accessed the 
magazine release button and loaded a new magazine (unloaded) into the weapon. The 
manual dexterity evolution was repeated using flight gloves and the results were 
documented. 
3. Results
The results of the two field tests conducted are recorded in the following sections. 
Each section briefly describes HFD’s results. The section concludes with an evaluation of 
the field testing. 
206 The burn building at the training complex has 12’ ceilings. Houston Fire Department, unpublished 
field notes, August 10, 2015. 
207 Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, August 10, 2015. 
208 The information provided in this section was obtained from the Houston Fire Department, 
unpublished field notes, August 11, 2015. 
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a. Test 1: Thermal Resistance 
Within 10 minutes of beginning the evolution, participant #1 documented 
discomfort and overheating in both hands while wearing the structural firefighting gloves 
and resorted to shielding the gloved hands away from the heat source; the temperature 
was recorded at a point on the wall 3’ above ground level to be 230°F.209 Participant #2 
recorded a similar outcome at the 10-minute mark while wearing the structural 
firefighting gloves. Within 10 minutes of wearing the flight gloves, participant #1 did not 
feel thermal discomfort in either hand. At the 15-minute mark, participant #1 documented 
the feeling of heat to both hands but did not feel pain. While wearing the flight gloves, 
participant #2 documented the sensation of heat, but no discomfort within 10 minutes of 
the evolution.210  
b. Test 2: Dexterity 
During the first evolution, the structural firefighting gloves were used. The field 
notes indicated difficulty and clumsiness in manipulating the weapon and when 
unholstering. Neither participant was able to access the trigger due to the bulk of the 
heavy leather gloves, which prevented them from getting past the trigger guard. The 
notes and evidence reveal difficulty in releasing empty magazines and reloading the 
weapon with a second magazine. The participants relied on the second hand to guide the 
weapon back into the holster.  
While wearing the flight gloves, the field notes indicated the officers were able to 
draw their holstered weapon and access the trigger without difficulty. The notes also 
indicated they did not struggle to access the magazine release button and were able to 
reload a new magazine. In addition, the participants were able to holster the handgun 
without using the second hand to guide the weapon into the holster. 
                                                 




The field notes indicated the flight gloves used during the evolution protected the 
hands from heat equally well or better than the firefighting gloves. In addition, the flight 
gloves permitted the drawing of holstered weapons and magazine changes without 
difficulty; those using the structural firefighting gloves struggled to complete the 
evolution. Finally, re-holstering the weapon with one hand was easier with the flight 
gloves than with the structural firefighting gloves.  
C. BALLISTIC VESTS AND TURNOUT GEAR 
To protect first responders from a fire combined with an armed active assailant, 
responders will require protective equipment suited to the multiple threat environment. 
The HFD conducted field testing to evaluate the feasibility of wearing body armor in 
conjunction with structural firefighting bunker gear and a SCBA ensemble. This section 
describes the purpose, methods and results of HFD’s field testing of different ballistic 
vests worn in conjunction with structural firefighter bunker gear. It evaluates their field 
testing and documents their decisions to design the field testing in the manner in which 
they did.  
1. Purpose
The purpose of these field tests was to assess the ability of personnel to wear 
ballistic protection in conjunction with full firefighter PPE. According to the National 
Institute of Justice (NIJ), body armor is classified based on its level of ballistic 
resistance.211 A corresponding increase in weight occurs with increased levels of ballistic 
protection; however, additional weight in the form of a ballistic vest was a key 
consideration since greater weight leads to faster fatigue of personnel.212 Other factors 
considered during the evaluation were the overall comfort of the vest when worn in 
combination with the firefighting ensemble and the possibility of overheating the wearer.  
211 National Institute of Justice, “Body Armor Performance Standards,” accessed October 1, 2015, 
http://www.nij.gov/topics/technology/body-armor/pages/standards.aspx. 
212 Lee et al., “The Impact of Firefighter Personal Protective Equipment and Treadmill Protocol on 
Maximal Oxygen Uptake.” 
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2. Method 
The HFD conducted field tests using ballistic vests offering varying levels of 
ballistic protection: Level II, Level III, and Level IV. Department issued structural 
firefighting bunker gear was used (pants, coat, boots, helmet, hood, gloves, facepiece, 
and SCBA). Given that the testing combined the protective gear of the fire service and 
law enforcement, the HFD utilized firefighters who were state certified as both Texas 
peace officers and as firefighters with a minimum of seven years of field experience in 
each discipline.213 For each test, the subjects donned identical ballistic vests and 
documented comfort level, maneuverability, and fatigue during live fire conditions. The 
first two trials utilized the same two participants, but only one of those participants was 
available for the third trial. The trials were held on three different days but at the same 
venue. The field tests took place at the HFD’s training facility located at 8030 Braniff, in 
Houston, Texas, in the department’s live fire training structure (“burn building”).  
Three wooden pallets were ignited using a natural gas feed in the designated first 
floor burn chamber. Temperature readings were taken throughout the exercises using 
thermal imaging cameras. In addition to body armor, each subject donned department 
issued bunker pants, coats, boots, reed hoods, gloves, helmets, SCBAs with a mask, a 
clip-on light, a radio, 9 mm blue guns, and a thermal imaging camera. The subjects 
remained on tank air during each evolution and each subject cycled through two 60-
minute bottles. Temperature readings were assessed with a TIC and reported every 10 
minutes by a safety officer.  
During the first two evolutions, a two-person team, wearing full protective gear 
and breathing tank air, entered the structure and worked their way through the building, 
clearing rooms using IARD techniques. Continuous communication and activity was 
maintained throughout. When one of the team member’s low air warning alerted, both 
teammates exited the building and received new air bottles. Once the new air bottles were 
secured to the SCBA, the team entered the building and resumed clearing rooms until one 
of the team member’s low air warning alerted and the team exited the building, 
                                                 
213 The participants were members of Houston Fire Department’s Arson Bureau. Houston Fire 
Department, unpublished field notes, August 10, 2015. 
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concluding the evolution. During the third evolution, one of the team members was 
unavailable to participate, but the HFD proceeded with the evolution using a single 
officer entry unit. The same evolution was conducted with the exception of the loss of a 
team member. 
3. Results
This section reports the results of HFD’s field testing of Level II, III, and IV body 
armor while worn with structural firefighter PPE. The information was obtained from 
HFD unplublished field notes. The findings are followed by an evaluation of HFD’s field 
testing and the significance of their results. 
a. Test #1: Firefighter PPE, SCBA, and Level II Body Armor214
On October 2, 2015, members of the HFD documented the results of the first PPE 
ensemble evolution.215 Level II vests were worn beneath the bunker gear.216 At the 10-
minute mark, the floor temperature was recorded at 114°F and the ceiling temperature 
was recorded at 460°F.217 The air bottles used during the evolution contained 4,100 psi 
of air.  
Level II vests are soft (flexible) body armor capable of protecting against various 
handguns.218 The field notes indicated the Level II vest did not cause any observable 
level of discomfort during the evolution.219 The vest was flexible enough to allow 
unrestricted movement and was not noticeable when worn with the firefighting gear. The 
notes reported the vest did not impede full expansion during exertion and did not produce 
thermal discomfort. The participants remained in the building for 24 minutes, received a 
214 The information provided in this section was obtained from the Houston Fire Department, 
unpublished field notes, October 2, 2015. 
215 Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, October 2, 2015. 
216 The vest weighed 3.5 pounds. Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, October 2, 2015. 
217 The ceiling height was 12 feet. Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, October 2, 
2015. 
218 National Institute of Justice, “Body Armor Performance Standards”; Level II armor is rated to 
protect against .22LR cartridges, .380 ACP, 9mm, and .40 S&W.  
219 Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, October 2, 2015. 
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replacement air bottle, and worked for an additional 20 minutes (for a total of 44 minutes 
of searching). They exited when alerted by the low air warning. 
The field notes documented concerns with other aspects of the protective 
ensemble.220 While the handheld TIC afforded the ability to see through smoke, allowing 
the efficient clearing of a room with low visibility, using the handheld TIC left only one 
hand to handle the firearm. The handheld TIC also became heavy as the evolution 
proceeded, contributing to less frequent use. The personal alert safety system (PASS 
device) integrated into the SCBAs alerted several times during the evolution when the 
team stood still for 30 seconds or more, causing them to stop what they were doing to 
silence the alarm. The team adapted by rocking in place or bouncing on their toes to fool 
the PASS device.221 The team reported that the style of hood restricted their head 
movement to such an extent that they had to pivot at the waist or shuffle their feet to scan 
rooms and to maintain situational awareness. A final concern of the participants involved 
the reflective material on the bunker gear. It is an NFA requirement; however, the field 
notes stated that when illuminated with a light or by flames, the reflective material 
became visible through the smoke and made concealment more difficult.  
b. Test #2: Firefighter PPE, SCBA, and Level III Body Armor222 
On November 14, 2015, members of the HFD conducted the second PPE trial.223 
Level III stand-alone vests with a front and back 10” x 12” polyethylene shooter’s cut 
plate were worn beneath the bunker gear.224 Temperature readings were assessed with a 
TIC and reported every 10 minutes. The four air bottles (two for each team member) used 
during the evolution contained 4,100 psi.225 The same participants in Test #1 were used 
                                                 
220 The information provided in this section was obtained from the Houston Fire Department from 
unpublished field notes, October 2, 2015. 
221 Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, October 2, 2015. 
222 The information provided in this section was obtained from the Houston Fire Department, 
unpublished field notes, November 14, 2015. 
223 Ibid. 
224 The information provided in this section was obtained from the Houston Fire Department, 
unpublished field notes, November 14, 2015. The body armor weighed 7.8 pounds and consisted of two 
plates and a plate carrier.  
225 Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, November 14, 2015. 
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in Test #2. The Level III vests weighed 7.8 pounds and were four pounds heavier than the 
Level II vest. In addition, the Level II vests were bulkier; the poly plates were each about 
1” thick and added about 2” of girth. The field notes indicated that when the team 
members donned their bunker coats, they could not secure the buttons and d-rings. The 
team was provided larger coats and finished dressing out. The notes indicated the team 
did not have difficulty breathing and neither overheated nor felt fatigued. The evolution 
lasted a total of 39 minutes. The first round of bottles was replaced after 22 minutes of 
work and the second round lasted 17 minutes.  
The field notes again cited the same issues with the cumbersome nature of the 
handheld TIC, the difficulty in scanning a room while wearing the rigid hood, the loss of 
concealment due to the reflective surface of the bunker gear, and the need to move 
constantly because of the PASS alert.226 
c. Test #3: Firefighter PPE, SCBA, and Level IV Body Armor227
On November 17, 2015, members of the HFD conducted the third PPE trial.228 
Only one of the team members participated in this evolution and wore a Level IV 10’ x 
12’ shooter’s cut ceramic chest plate in conjunction with IIIA soft armor vest under 
bunker gear.229 Temperature readings were assessed with a TIC and reported every 10 
minutes. During the evolution, the first air bottle lasted 19 minutes and the second bottle 
lasted 12 minutes. The notes indicated the participant voluntarily terminated the evolution 
with 1,800 psi remaining in the tank.230 The notes indicated that overheating and fatigue 
were factors in the termination of the evolution. The field notes once again cited the same 
226 The information provided in this section was obtained from the Houston Fire Department, 
unpublished field notes, November 14, 2015. 
227 Ibid. 
228 The information provided in this section was obtained from the Houston Fire Department, 
unpublished field notes, November 17, 2015. 
229 The local SWAT team used this body armor. The plate was a composite of alumina ceramic/
aramid. The vest weighed 18 pounds and did not include neck, groin, or deltoid protection. “Hard Body 
Armor,” 2016, http://www.pointblankenterprises.com/paraclete/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/04/ 
Hard-Armor-2016-10046-Product-Sheet.pdf.  
230 The information provided in this section was obtained from the Houston Fire Department, 
unpublished field notes, November 17, 2015. 
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issues with the cumbersome nature of the handheld TIC, the difficulty in scanning a room 
while wearing the rigid hood, the loss of concealment due to the reflective surface of the 
bunker gear, and the need to move constantly because of the PASS alert.231 
4. Evaluation 
Based on HFD’s fieldwork, the following conclusions were made. The Level II 
vest produced the least amount of strain on the participants. This result was not surprising 
given that the Level II vest weighed the least (3.5 pounds), was thin, and flexible. While 
wearing the Level II vest, the participants reported no impact on their performance within 
the heated environment nor struggled to complete the evolution.232 Of the three vests 
evaluated, however, the Level II vest offered the least amount of protection against 
ballistics. It is used by law enforcement personnel as concealable general patrol duty 
protective equipment able to stop handgun rounds. Level II is not considered sufficient 
protection for pursuing active shooters and will not protect the wearer from rifle rounds, 
.357, or .44 Magnum cartridges.233  
The Level IV plate on the vest provided the greatest amount of protection against 
ballistics. Level IV vests are rated to stop large (30–06) armor piercing rounds; however, 
that level of protection comes at the price of more weight. The vest tested weighed 18 
pounds; five times the weight of the Level II vest and twice as much as the Level III vest 
(7.8 pounds). The field notes documented a marked difference while wearing the Level 
IV vest.234 Further contributing to the discomfort with the gear combination was the 
complication that occurred when the bunker coat and SCBA were donned. As they 
settled, they pulled on the ballistic vest, causing it to slide back in such a way that the 
participant’s neck was slightly constricted by the collar area of the vest. As the evolution 
continued, the equipment continued to settle and the pressure of the vest against the neck 
                                                 
231 The information provided in this section was obtained from the Houston Fire Department, 
unpublished field notes, November 17, 2015. 
232 Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, October 2, 2015. 
233 National Institute of Justice, “Body Armor Performance Standards.” 
234 Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, November 14, 2015; Houston Fire Department, 
unpublished field notes, November 17, 2015. 
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increased to the point that the team member compensated by maintaining the neck 
muscles flexed.235  
The Level III vest, weighing at 7.8 pounds, reportedly had less of an adverse 
performance impact than the Level IV vest, yet is able to provide protection against rifle 
rounds, such as the .308 and .223.236 While using this vest resulted in increased bulk, 
requiring larger bunker coats, the level of discomfort was reported to be manageable by 
the team members. However, endurance appeared to be affected.237 The team used the air 
supply in the cylinders at a faster rate while wearing the Level III vest than the Level II.  
In addition to documenting exercise performance with the vest and firefighting 
PPE ensemble, the field notes also provided insight related to other pieces of equipment 
carried.238 The use of a TIC only allowed team members the use of one hand for the 
firearm, which is an area of concern. While the handheld TIC provided a tactical 
advantage for target acquisition and situational awareness within low visibility 
environments, it was described as cumbersome and heavy. The teams attempted to 
compensate by clipping the TIC to their SCBAs to allow two hands for weapon 
manipulation, but still had to release the weapon with their weak hand to point the TIC 
when scanning.239  
The field notes consistently reported that the style of hood used with the ensemble 
felt restrictive and did not allow participants to move their neck to scan a room. 
Consequently, the team had to pivot at the waist or shuffle their feet and move their entire 
bodies to look around the room the when searching.240 An alternative to the Reed style 
235 Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, November 17, 2015. 
236 National Institute of Justice, “Body Armor Performance Standards.” 
237 Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, October 2, 2015; Houston Fire Department, 
unpublished field notes, November 14, 2015; Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, November 
17, 2015. 
238 The information provided in this section was obtained from the Houston Fire Department, 
unpublished field notes, November 17, 2015. 
239 Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, October 2, 2015; Houston Fire Department, 
unpublished field notes, November 14, 2015; Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, November 
17, 2015. 
240 This observation was obtained through direct experimentation of the author. 
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hood used could be a knit hood that provides for greater range of motion but offers less 
thermal protection.  
Another documented issue concerned the reflective material on the bunker gear. 
Whenever a light shined on the material, it reflected the light and made concealment 
difficult.241 The field notes raised concerns that teams would be too visible to an assailant 
even through the smoke.242 In addition, the audible alarms on the SCBAs presented 
challenges. The alarms automatically alert when a firefighter is in distress and stops 
moving for 30 seconds or more.243 Law enforcement personnel may need to stand still for 
more than 30 seconds, triggering the alarms, which emit sounds in excess of 95 decibels, 
and flashing lights.244 While these lights and alarms are necessary for a firefighting 
environment, they could impact the mission success of a multi-disciplinary team with the 
shared goals of trying to control a fire while simultaneously seeking armed assailants.  
D. LESSONS LEARNED BY THE HFD245 
While working toward developing its tactical firefighter team, the HFD began 
with the question: Is it realistic or feasible to equip an entry team across fire and police 
disciplines in such a way that they are protected from thermal injury and from gunfire yet 
agile enough to rescue victims, contain and extinguish fire, and neutralize shooters? 
To answer that question, the HFD conducted various field tests of protective 
equipment to assess the efficacy of combining first responder gear not traditionally worn 
together. The HFD documented the effects of discharging firearms of different calibers at 
compressed air cylinders used in self-contained breathing apparatus. They also explored 
whether flight gloves could provide sufficient manual dexterity and thermal protection to 
a law enforcement officer exposed to a fire and heat while deploying a firearm. Lastly, 
241 This observation was obtained through direct experimentation of the author. 
242 Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, November 17, 2015. 
243 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1981: Standard on Open-Circuit Self-Contained 
Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) for Emergency Services. 
244 Ibid. 
245 The information provided in this section was obtained from a Houston Fire Department internal 
memo, January 4, 2016. 
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the HFD assessed the ability of an operator wearing firefighting PPE and ballistic 
protection to meet mission objectives within an environment with combined fire and 
ballistic threats. As a result of their field tests, several lessons were learned, unexpected 
results were documented, and additional questions emerged.  
1. Finding #1: The 190 Pound Mannequin Was Not Propelled through
the Air246
The researchers originally expected the mannequin to be propelled several feet 
from the stand; however, that was not the case. Since they were initially unsure of the 
damage that would be inflicted on the air packs, the researchers deliberately removed the 
hoses, gauges, and regulators normally connected to the cylinder. What was not expected 
was that the escaping air would produce sufficient force to break the air pack’s retention 
strap and that the cylinder would travel such a great distance (80 yards). Future 
researchers should consider field-testing the air pack in its entirety—including the hoses, 
couplings, and facepiece—to determine whether tethering the tank to the air pack would 
produce any change in outcome. 
2. Finding #2: The SCBA Cylinder Did Not Explode when Struck by 
Ammunition247
When struck by projectiles, none of the SCBA cylinders exploded; however, 
several of the rounds did damage the cylinder and caused the air to escape. In the HFD’s 
field tests, handgun cartridges did not appear to damage the integrity of the SCBA bottle 
and cause an air release or loss of breathable air; however, the handgun projectiles struck 
the bottles and traveled along the curvature of the cylinders before slowing and becoming 
embedded in the composite fibers of the exterior wrapping. The long guns produced 
varying degrees of structural damage to the cylinders. While it took five shots with a 
shotgun slug to crack the tank and slowly release the air, the damage caused by the .223 
caliber cartridge, used in assault rifles, was devastating. The projectile carried sufficient 
force to puncture the tank, allowing the air supply to escape quickly, leaving the wearer 
246 Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, October 9, 2015. 
247 Ibid. 
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without breathable air within a minute. In addition, evidence of scorching throughout the 
inside of the tank indicated that combustion was sustained for an unknown amount of 
time. Further research is needed to assess whether the heat transfer to the air supply could 
damage the wearer’s lungs. The .308 caliber round also immediately caused catastrophic 
damage to the tank and led to air loss within less than one minute. It was the only round 
tested with sufficient force to penetrate both sides of the air cylinder and continue 
approximately 1/2” into the mannequin. The air from the cylinder escaped within a few 
seconds and caused the tank to detach itself from the mannequin. Consequently, impact 
to the SCBA with this round would be immediately catastrophic to an operator even in 
the presence of adequate body armor (Level III or IV) since there would be insufficient 
time to locate an alternative source of breathable air. 
3. Finding #3: Protective Equipment Must Work as a Cohesive 
Ensemble248
The HFD field tests highlighted the importance of combining protective gear 
across disciplines. The HFD’s findings support the use of Level II and Level III vests in 
combination with firefighting PPE. The Level IV vest, while effective gunfire protection, 
did not allow for heat dissipation and overheated the operator. Of the three types of vests 
field tested, only the Level IV caused fatigue and overheating to such an extent that the 
participant voluntarily terminated the evolution. No observable thermal burden was 
evident with a Level II vest, but it does not provide ballistic protection against long 
guns.249 According to HFD’s field notes, the Level III vest provides protection from 
rifles and allowed the operators to sustain operations in pursuit of an assailant.250 
Several unanticipated outcomes resulted when the vest and bunker gear were 
worn together. One of the most disconcerting events occurred when a ballistic vest settled 
248 Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, August 10, 2015; Houston Fire Department; 
unpublished field notes, August 11, 2015; Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, October 2, 
2015; Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, October 9, 2015; Houston Fire Department, 
unpublished field notes, November 14, 2015; Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, November 
17, 2015. 
249 National Institute of Justice, Selection and Application Guide to Ballistic-Resistant Body Armor for 
Law Enforcement, Corrections and Public Safety (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2014). 
250 Houston Fire Department, internal memo, January 4, 2016. 
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and slid backwards after the bunker coat and air pack had been donned by the operator, 
causing pressure on the operator’s neck.251 Continued movement exacerbated the airway 
constriction, and once inside the burn building and performing the evolution, the operator 
was no longer in a position to make equipment adjustments. This finding suggests that 
the ballistic vest needs to be fitted and adjusted properly to the operator so that it does not 
shift or slide when worn with other gear. However, the vest must still allow room for 
adequate chest expansion during times of exertion and for heat dissipation. The bunker 
coat also needs to be sized slightly larger to allow for the bulk of the ballistic plates.252  
The HFD also raised concerns regarding the ability of law enforcement officers to 
provide force protection to firefighters in the heated space, typically encountered during 
building fires, in which ambient temperatures could exceed the human body’s ability to 
tolerate burns. According to NIST, humans begin to feel pain when exposed to heat at 
111°F; however, human skin can actually sustain burns at 109°F when exposed to that 
temperature for several hours.253 Exposure to 118°F results in immediate first-degree 
burns. At 131°F, second-degree burns are sustained. Third-degree burns are sustained 
within five seconds of exposure to 140°F. Given the human body’s relatively low 
threshold to tolerate burns, law enforcement personnel are extremely limited in their 
ability to enter the fire environment without specialized firefighting PPE (bunker gear, 
structural firefighting gloves, and SCBAs).  
In addition to protecting the wearer from thermal injury, firefighting gloves are 
designed to provide protection from abrasion, cuts, and penetrating trauma due to the 
debris encountered in structure fires; consequently, they are often constructed of thick 
rugged materials like leather.254 That level of protection, however, comes at a price 
principally in the form of lost manual dexterity and fine motor movement. The loss of 
that ability is unfortunately catastrophic to a law enforcement officer who relies on 
251 Houston Fire Department, internal memo, November 17, 2016. 
252 Ibid. 
253 “Fire Dynamics,” accessed May 25, 2016, http://www.nist.gov/fire/fire_behavior.cfm?o=37981 
&l=dir&qsrc=990&qo=contentPageRelatedSearch& ad=SEO&ap=search.yahoo.com&an=SEO.  
254 Dodson, Firefighter’s Handbook: Firefighting and Emergency Response, 129. 
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dexterity and fine motor movement to manipulate the firearm. In addition, officers must 
often rely on feel since their visual field is focused on maintaining situational awareness 
and target acquisition.  
While the officer needs the thermal protection afforded by fire gloves and not 
provided by tactical shooting gloves, the officer does not require the protection from cuts 
and penetrating trauma that can result from fire debris, breaching, and handling fire 
hoses. At a minimum, protection of the police officers’ hands is of vital importance since 
any injury or discomfort to them can adversely impact an officer’s ability to use a 
firearm, consequently impacting the ability to execute the tactical mission. Law 
enforcement tactical shooting gloves are not designed for the hot firefighting 
environment and provide inadequate thermal protection. Providing police officers with 
firefighting gloves is not a viable option since their bulky nature impedes the police 
officer’s ability to manipulate and shoot a firearm effectively. Given that neither 
firefighter gloves nor law enforcement gloves could provide the necessary thermal 
barrier, yet allow for manual dexterity, the HFD looked for alternative gloves used in 
other industries. They hypothesized that gloves designed for pilots could be used for 
entry into the fire environment if they were rated to withstand flash fires.255 The HFD 
tested two types of gloves (department issue structural firefighting gloves and fire rated 
flight gloves) in an effort to find a style that could provide both thermal protection and 
manual dexterity to those handling weapons. Reportedly, the flight gloves handled the 
heat, as well as the firefighting gloves and allowed for weapon manipulation.256 The 
HFD’s field test appears to support the use of thermal-rated flight gloves for use by law 
enforcement personnel in a heated environment.  
The HFD’s field testing indicated that flight gloves with thermal resistance ratings 
have the potential to provide law enforcement personnel with the ability to operate their 
firearms effectively in a hot environment while providing protection to the officer’s 
hands. However, the functionality of flight gloves is limited since they are not 
sufficiently ruggedized to protect the wearer from sharp objects. The advantages of 
                                                 
255 Houston Fire Department, internal memo, August 3, 2015.  
256 Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, August 10, 2015. 
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leather gloves lie in their ability to withstand the repeated physical abuse encountered 
when pulling hoses, and manipulate sharp and edged objects. A tactical entry team will 
need both types of gloves to allow moving from one task to another. 
The Reed hood was found to be too rigid and detrimental to law enforcement 
objectives because it impeded the ability to rotate the head for scanning the room.257 The 
Reed hood is constructed of the same material used in bunker gear (Kevlar) and provides 
the chemical barrier that the HFD desires; however, it limits the wearer’s ability to move 
the neck from side to side. An alternative would be to use the more flexible knit hood that 
provides thermal protection yet allows a greater range of motion of the neck. The main 
advantage to the knit hood is that it is constructed of a flexible fire resistant fiber (Nomex 
blend) providing the ability to rotate the neck.258 Further study is required on the 
practicality of one style hood over the other, particularly for law enforcement personnel 
who need to find assailants within a structure. 
In addition, the fire service’s NFPA requirements for audible alarms, warning 
lights, and reflective materials on their protective equipment create concealment 
difficulties for law enforcement and could adversely impact the team’s safety by 
revealing its whereabouts to an assailant.259 Alternative law enforcement SCBA models 
should be considered to address the need for concealment, and consideration should be 
given to the removal of the reflective material on the bunker gear. 
257 Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, November 14, 2015; Houston Fire Department, 
unpublished field notes, November 17, 2015. 
258 Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute, Project Responder 4: 2014 National 
Technology Plan for Emergency Response to Catastrophic Incidents (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Project%20Responder%2 
04_1.pdf. 
259 National Fire Protection Association, National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1971: Standard 
on Protective Ensembles for Structural Fire Fighting and Proximity Fire Fighting; National Fire Protection 
Association, National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1981: Standard on Open-Circuit Self-Contained 
Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) for Emergency Services.”  
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4. Finding #4: Handheld Thermal Imaging Cameras Are Inadequate260 
The field testing also revealed additional equipment needs that had not initially 
been anticipated. First responders rely on thermal imaging cameras to see within low 
visibility environments. A law enforcement officer relies on vision for target acquisition. 
In a low visibility, smoky environment, thermal imaging cameras are the only means of 
seeing inside the structure; however, when one of the operator’s hands is dedicated to 
holding the thermal imaging camera, only one hand is available to handle the firearm. In 
the future, a hands-free thermal imaging camera needs to be evaluated to determine 
whether it provides the desired situational awareness. A periodic review of technological 
advances should be conducted, since augmented reality built into the firefighting 
facepiece is in development and could offer a better solution in the near future.  
E. SUMMARY 
Complex, multifaceted threats will require not only a cross-disciplinary incident 
response by first responders, but will also require the first responder to be equipped 
across disciplines. The equipment and weapons worn by the team will need to be 
appropriate to the environment to protect the responders and provide them with a tactical 
advantage. However, the various elements that comprise first responder protective 
equipment are often developed and tested in isolation from each other. To optimize the 
functionality and performance of protective equipment, a systems or modular approach is 
required.261 The HFD’s findings support the cross-equipping of an entry team for a mixed 
threat environment by creating a PPE ensemble composed of elements traditionally worn 
by various first responders but have not historically been worn together. This team will 
need firefighter structural PPE combined with ballistic vests typically used by law 
enforcement to protect against rifle rounds. Gloves are a part of the firefighting ensemble; 
however, to accommodate the threat encountered, a set of flight gloves can be added to 
                                                 
260 Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, October 2, 2015; Houston Fire Department, 
unpublished field notes, November 14, 2015; Houston Fire Department, unpublished field notes, November 
17, 2015. 
261 Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute, Project Responder 4: 2014 National 
Technology Plan for Emergency Response to Catastrophic Incidents, 101. 
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the ensemble to allow the team to adapt between fighting fire and firing weapons. 
Additionally, tools, such as thermal imagers, will provide the team with a tactical 
advantage within a low visibility environment. Although the weight of the bunker gear 
will increase slightly due to the addition of the ballistic vest, it did not create such a 
burden as to inhibit the ability of the team to operate.  
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Complex hostile events and paramilitary terrorist assaults go by many names: 
Mumbai attack, hybrid targeted violence, multiple modality attack, and complex active 
shooter assault. Emergency management experts Shahrzad Rizvi and Joshua Kelly 
contend that “attacks such as the Westgate Mall attack in 2013, the 2014 Peshawar school 
massacre in Pakistan, and the 2015 attack on the Charlie Hebdo office in Paris serve to 
remind us that Mumbai-style attacks are the new normal for terrorists.”262 Unlike the 
typical American active shooter event, paramilitary assaults around the world often result 
in high casualty and high wounding rates.263 They involve a combination of tactics that 
overwhelm first responders and delay the response by requiring the integration of 
multiple first responder strategies to mitigate the incident.264 In addition to shooting, this 
type of attack typically incorporates other tactics, such as hostage taking, IEDs, or fire to 
attract media coverage and overwhelm the emergency responders.265 “Planning and 
weapons proficiency are distinctive features of the attack.”266 Furthermore, the assailants 
seek to engage law enforcement in battle without stopping to negotiate.267 These 
incidents are among the most dangerous that first responders will encounter during their 
careers. Multiple hazards are simultaneously in play and often lead to unpredictable 
outcomes, as was evident when the twin towers collapsed at the World Trade Center on 
9/11. According to the NIST study, it was not the impact of the aircraft that caused the 
buildings to collapse, it was the structural failure induced by prolonged exposure to 
                                                 
262 Rizvi and Kelly, “The Continued Relevance of the November 2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attack: 
Countering New Attacks with Old Lessons.” 
263 New York Police Department Intelligence Division, Mumbai Attack Analysis (New York: New 
York Police Department Intelligence Division, 2008). 
264 Ibid. 
265 Angel Rabasa et al., The Lessons of Mumbai (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009).  
266 Rizvi and Kelly, “The Continued Relevance of the November 2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attack: 
Countering New Attacks with Old Lessons.” 
267 Terrorists Can Think Strategically: Lessons Learned from the Mumbai Attacks, Testimony 
presented before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (2009) (Brian 
Michael Jenkins). 
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fire.268 To mitigate these emergencies and increase the survival of the victims, the first 
responder community must actively develop the capability to respond within a dynamic 
and austere threat environment involving the use of fire as a weapon or delay tactic.269 
This attack style is designed to overwhelm local resources through its unpredictability 
and speed; therefore, an effective response by public safety personnel will need to be 
equally flexible and adaptive. 
This thesis examined the need for and utilization of tactical firefighter teams in 
the U.S. fire service to assist law enforcement during hostile events requiring combined 
fire and police skill sets to mitigate the incident. The merits and limitations of different 
tactical fire team models currently in use in the United States were presented. The latest 
assaults have witnessed an emerging trend where the goal of the assailants is to kill as 
many people as possible. With little intention of negotiation by the attackers, hostages 
have become doomed captives whose only chance of survival is the swift action by public 
safety personnel.270 
Some of the earliest attempts at creating cross-disciplinary teams involved the 
embedding of firefighters within SWAT teams to assist with medical interventions or 
firefighting support during the incident. Agencies, such as the Palm Bay Fire Department, 
Clayton County (GA) Fire and Emergency Services, LFRA use a SWAT-Tactical Medic 
and SWAT-Tactical Firefighter model to respond to hostile events. The benefit of this 
model is the tactical expertise developed by a small cadre of select firefighters through 
monthly training and annual testing with the SWAT team. The limitations of this model 
involve the extended response time when the team is off-duty and must be recalled. 
Potentially, during incidents in which hostages are exposed to fire and smoke, there may 
be insufficient time to mobilize a SWAT response. While the LFRA does not arm its 
268 “NIST WTC 7 Investigation Finds Building Fire Caused Collapse,” August 21, 2008, http:// 
www.nist.gov/public_affairs/releases/wtc-082108.cfm.  
269 Ibid. 
270 Ahmed S. Hashim, Cities under Siege: Mass Casualty Urban Terrorism Assaults (Singapore: 
Nanyang Technological University S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2016), 5, http://www. 
rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/PR160505_Cities-under-Siege.pdf; Natasha Bertrand and Pamela 
Engel, “The FBI Director Painted a Bizarre Picture of the Man Behind the Worst Mass Shooting in U.S. 
History,” Business Insider, June 13, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/james-comey-orlando-shooting-
omar-mateen-fbi-2016-6.  
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SWAT firefighters, Palm Bay and Clayton County have deputized them when they 
function in a medical capacity.271 However, weapons are not allowed during firefighting 
activities.  
The Charlotte Fire Department has implemented a tactical fire team specifically 
trained to link up with SWAT and other law enforcement personnel at hostile events. 
This team does not wear ballistic protection and is designed to only advance into the 
warm zone while SWAT provides them armed protection. They too are limited in their 
ability to engage in an interior fire attack under direct threat. In contrast, the FDNY has 
not developed a special operations tactical firefighter team but has instead implemented a 
rescue task force model in which any one of 11,000 firefighters can link up with any of 
NYPD’s 35,000 officers to conduct warm zone operations. This model provides a rapid 
response capability; however, the firefighters receive neither ballistic protection nor 
specialized tactical law enforcement training. Since these models limit the entry of 
firefighters to warm zone operations, hostages located within areas of direct threat in 
which smoke and fire are present will be inaccessible to rescuers allowing assailants 
ample time to “(i) kill as many people as they are able to; (ii) gain as much media 
mileage of their butchery; and (iii) highlight government ineptitude.”272  
To address this response gap, the HFD explored ways of introducing fire 
personnel into hot zones or direct threat operations by field testing adaptations to the 
protection ensembles worn by firefighters and police officers. Their findings support the 
concept of combining ballistic vests with structural firefighting bunker gear to engage in 
interior fire suppression during hostile events. The HFD model also proposed combining 
law enforcement rapid deployment tactics with firefighting tactics and the introduction of 
armed public safety personnel into areas where fire and smoke are present, however, this 
area needs further research and analysis particularly with respect to the effects of heat on 
live ammunition. 
271 “Palm Bay Adds Six Paramedics to SWAT Team,” October 1, 2012, http://spacecoastdaily.com/ 
2012/10/palm-bay-adds-six-paramedics-to-swat-team/.  
272 Hashim, Cities Under Siege: Mass Casualty Urban Terrorism Assaults, 3. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis recommends the implementation of a tiered deployment model for 
tactical fire teams responding to hostile events.273 Tiered EMS deployment services have 
proven advantageous in large urban jurisdictions in which the entire department is trained 
to handle routine incidents and specialists receive additional training and equipment to 
address incidents with the greatest complexity.274 This same rationale is used for the 
development of special operations teams, such as urban search and rescue units and 
HazMat response teams. A tiered model will allow for scalability and can provide 
jurisdictions with the capacity to respond to multiple hostile events of varying degrees in 
complexity.  
1. Develop Rescue Task Force Capabilities for All Emergency Response 
Personnel
The rescue task force model implemented by the FDNY ensures rapid response to 
hostile events during the earliest stages. These units provide a large pool of personnel for 
less tactically complex tasks that still require firefighting skill sets. By combining with 
available police officers, these teams can provide fire, rescue, and EMS support within 
warm zones. 
2. Incorporate Charlotte Fire Department’s and Loveland Fire Rescue
Authority’s Models to Assist Law Enforcement Personnel
Researchers have demonstrated that tactically complex tasks and complex motor 
skills require repetitive training to ingrain movement into the motor memory when under 
extreme stress.275 Chaotic unstable environments can increase stress reactions that further 
273 Jack Stout, Paul E. Pepe, and Vincent N. Mosesso, Jr., “All-Advanced Life Support vs Tiered-
Response Ambulance Systems,” Prehospital Emergency Care: Official Journal of the National Association 
of EMS Physicians and the National Association of State EMS Directors 4, no. 1 (2000): 1–6, http://www. 
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10634274. 
274 Thomas H. Blackwell and Jay S. Kaufman, “Response Time Effectiveness: Comparison of 
Response Time and Survival in an Urban Emergency Medical Services System,” Academic Emergency 
Medicine: Official Journal of the Society for Academic Emergency Medicine 9, no. 4 (2002): 288–295. 
doi:10.1197/aemj.9.4.288.  
275 Richard A. Schmidt and Craig A. Wrisberg, Motor Learning and Performance: A Situation-Based 
Learning Approach, 4th ed. (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 2008), 7. 
79 
contribute to the obstacles the operators must overcome. Designate specific personnel at 
fire stations to receive tactical training for incorporation into SWAT teams to support 
breaching activities, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives (CBRNE) 
response, and gross decontamination during hostile events to include instances of civil 
unrest. Although these teams will be limited to warm zone operation, they will serve as a 
force multiplier especially when multiple venues are involved and resources will be 
spread throughout the area.  
3. Develop Special Operations Team for Response to Hostile Events
This thesis builds on existing tactical fire team models and offers an additional 
solution that takes advantage of the HFD’s arson investigation division. Commissioned 
by the State of Texas as firefighters and as peace officers, this workforce is trained in 
tactics for firefighting and policing and has the additional awareness of the challenges 
and limitations experienced across disciplines. With experience in fighting fire and 
experience as law enforcement officers, members of the arson unit are uniquely situated 
to respond as either a strike team capable of fire suppression, law enforcement rapid 
deployment to neutralize armed assault, or as a force multiplier to augment the efforts of 
existing rescue task forces during hostile events.  
This thesis does not advocate for the creation of a consolidated police and fire 
agency in which personnel are tasked with both law enforcement patrol duties and 
firefighting duties, but instead, seeks to deploy an existing, underutilized asset on an as-
needed basis.276 The HFD currently employs 70 full-time arson investigators who 
provide 24/7 coverage within the City of Houston.277 Every investigator began their 
career in the department as a firefighter and possesses a minimum of five years of 
service. Once promoted into the HFD Arson Bureau, investigators train at a six-month 
police academy and are later certified as peace officers in the State of Texas.278 Upon 
graduation, arson investigators are assigned to determine the origin and cause of fires and 
276 Vinicio R. Mata, “The Contribution of Police and Fire Consolidation to the Homeland Security 
Mission” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 64. 
277 Houston Fire Department, internal memo, January 4, 2016. 
278 Ibid. 
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to conduct criminal investigations for fire related felonies. As police officers, trained to 
expect violent resistance from suspects, they execute high-risk warrants for a variety of 
felonies ranging from arson to murder.279 Despite their cross-disciplinary experience, 
little effort has been made to incorporate this group into Houston’s homeland security 
endeavors simply because their primary job duties transitioned from emergency response 
to investigations. It should be noted that while this work is applicable to Houston, not all 
fire departments across the United States maintain full-time arson squads that have been 
certified as state peace officers. 
Arson investigators are typically committed to non-emergency, investigative tasks 
and could be deployed on an emergency basis when warranted. New tactics will need to 
be developed, as well as scenario-based exercises, to maintain the operational capacity of 
a team that will only respond to low frequency, high-risk events. Firefighting, breaching, 
tactical team movement, and weapons proficiency are perishable skills that necessitate 
repetitive training. However, responding to hostile events will require advanced skill sets 
with operators who can improvise when tactics or equipment fail. First units to enter must 
be autonomous and cross disciplined since unknown threats can be encountered. The role 
of this special operations team would be to disentangle the threats sufficiently to allow 
traditional firefighting units to continue extinguishing the fire and traditional law 
enforcement units to continue searching for assailants. According to HFD’s analysis, 
“minimal departmental costs would be incurred for periodic scenario-based training and 
drilling. Investigators currently have turnout gear and body armor; however, an initial 
startup cost would involve upgrading ballistic vests to use more expensive lightweight 
rifle plates.”280  
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis focused, in part, on the protective equipment needs of tactical fire 
teams for hot zone entry. However, the research did not address the effects of heat and 
fire to firearms and ammunitions. It is not uncommon for boxed ammunition to be 
279 Houston Fire Department, internal memo, January 4, 2016. 
280 Ibid. 
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encountered within structure fires. A 2012 ATF study documented the behavior of boxed 
ammunition in a compartment fire; however, it did not address whether ammunition 
loaded in weapons will react and auto-ignite at the same temperatures as boxed 
ammunition. The study discovered that when the cartridges reached temperatures ranging 
from 385°F to 529°F, ammunition will detonate and the round will travel several feet 
even when stored in its original boxed packaging.281 The ambient temperature in the 
compartment, however, was much higher than the temperature that needed to be absorbed 
by the propellant and primer, ranging from 585°F to 703°F. Temperature is an important 
detail since firefighting SCBA face masks are subject to failure at temperatures ranging 
from 250°F to 500°F.282 Potentially, it could mean that the limiting factor in withstanding 
heat is the capability of the facepiece and not of the ammunition.  
Research is also needed in the development of combined law enforcement and 
firefighting tactics within an incendiary environment. For example, awareness of 
thermodynamics could be used strategically both to protect hostages and neutralize 
assailants. Additionally, future studies are needed to examine the thermal effects on 
firearms and projectile trajectories.  
D. CONCLUSION 
To remain relevant, the fire service must periodically reassess the needs of the 
community it protects to create new strategies and tactics to meet those demands.283 
While suppressing fires remains a core capability, threats with a terrorist nexus have 
emerged and need to be embraced as a core competency. One of the challenges facing the 
fire service will be the acceptance of calculated risks in areas historically considered 
traditional police environments. Arguments against deployment of fire and EMS 
personnel into a police hot zone center on the notion of acceptable risk for firefighters. In 
a recent Homeland Security Affairs article, Marino et al. explained that the “concept of 
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scene safety is one that is ingrained in all fire and EMS personnel from the earliest stages 
of training.”284 While firefighters are comfortable entering incendiary environments, the 
police hot zone may pose too great a risk for fire and EMS responders to assume.285 Fire 
chiefs across the United States have made it clear they will not implement an approach, 
such as Moody proposes, to authorize emergency response personnel to enter an 
environment where shots are being fired, even with ballistic protection; at most, they will 
allow fire and EMS personnel to enter the warm zones while escorted by police.286 
However, when the lives of victims are jeopardized, public safety officials increasingly 
find themselves in positions where standard operating procedures are inadequate to 
address the changing threat environment.287 
Public safety organizations have a critical need to establish strategies for response 
to tactically complex hostile events with combined law enforcement and firefighting 
missions. This thesis presented the merits and limitations of different models regarding 
the role of firefighters during a paramilitary attack. The specific circumstances 
encountered during an emergency will dictate the most appropriate team to mitigate the 
crisis. Given Houston’s unique needs and resources, this thesis offered a fourth model for 
consideration and proposed the use of combat firefighting units staffed by on-duty arson 
investigators capable of entry into the hot zone. This option challenges the traditional 
roles and duties of emergency response personnel and serves to continue the dialogue. 
The tactical firefighter model is not to be viewed as a panacea but as an additional 
resource for the fire department in the event of a paramilitary attack. Sean Newman’s 
research demonstrated that “what is consistently absent from law enforcement 
preparations for a Mumbai-type terrorist event is the consideration of fire as part of the 
284 Marino et al., “To Save Lives and Property: High Threat Response.” 
285 Ibid. 
286 International Association of Fire Chiefs, Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Terrorist Events 
International Association of Fire Chiefs.  
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weapons mix.”288 This same lack of preparation is evident on the fire department side as 
well. By failing to consider the possibility of this type of assault, the responsibility of 
developing response strategies is left to the on-duty personnel who have little or no 
preparation to meet the demands of a rapidly unfolding paramilitary attack. The 
recommendation to deploy arson squad assets to terrorist attacks increases the capability 
of the HFD by providing additional skill sets from a workforce that has not historically 
been used in an emergency response setting. While it is not feasible to anticipate and 
develop responses to every single crisis, it is possible to increase the department’s 
capabilities to allow for greater adaptability in the midst of chaotic events. 
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